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ABSTRACT
A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY 
OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS AND MORAL REASONING 
BETWEEN AMERICAN AND CHINESE COLLEGE STUDENTS
Zhongtang Ren 
Old Dominion University, 2006 
Director: Dr. Stephen Tonelson
This study investigated the cultural differences of epistemological beliefs and moral 
reasoning between American and Chinese college students (N  = 452) recruited from three 
universities, Old Dominion University in the eastern United States, Luoyang Normal 
University in the central China and Central University for Nationalities in northern China. 
A series of factorial MANOVA was conducted to explore the influence of gender, 
ethnicity and nationality as the independent variables on epistemological beliefs 
measured with five EBI (Epistemological Beliefs Inventory) scores and moral reasoning 
measured with two DIT (Defining Issues Test) scores as dependent variables.
No effects were found for gender and ethnicity on epistemological beliefs and moral 
reasoning. Significant differences were found between American college students and 
Chinese college students in the epistemological beliefs of simple knowledge, certain 
knowledge, omniscient authority and quick learning. Additionally, a significant, but small 
correlation between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs was found in the 
American sample while no significant correlation was found between moral reasoning 
and epistemological beliefs in the Chinese group.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Epistemology, the philosophic study of the nature, origin and scope of human 
knowledge, has a long history of philosophers’ conceptual exploration (Lenk & Paul,
1993; Geaney, 2002; Paul, 2002). The term, derived from Greek episteme (i.e. knowledge) 
and logos (i.e. explanation), has remained a taproot of philosophical inquiry for centuries. 
Plato, in his Theaetus, explored the elemental components of knowledge—truth, belief 
and justification. Kant (1781) differentiated between a priori knowledge (i.e. what we 
know prior to experience) and a posterior knowledge (i.e. what we know based on 
experience), distinguishing rational knowledge from empirical knowledge. He argued 
that a prior knowledge is all of the following: 1) logically necessary, 2) not derivable 
from particular sensations and experiences, 3) presupposed in all our experiences, and 4) 
contributed by our mind. James (1890), Peirce (1877), Dewey (1916), and Whitehead 
(1967) indicated in their writings a psychological turn in issues related to knowledge and 
knowing.
Contemporary epistemological studies have shifted focus toward the empirical 
investigation of personal epistemological development and epistemological beliefs (Hofer, 
2004a), namely, 1) how individuals come to know, 2) how the individual develops a 
conception of knowledge, and 3) how that individual uses their knowledge to understand 
the world (Stewart, 2005). The third area, which centers on how epistemological 
assumptions influence thinking and reasoning process, will be the focus of this 
dissertation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The current study of personal epistemology began with the groundbreaking work 
of Perry (1970), whose research was based on a four-year study during which his team 
interviewed Harvard undergraduates. Using open-ended and nondirective longitudinal 
interviews as well as a paper-and-pencil instrument—the Checklist of Educational Views 
(CLEV), Perry and his team explored the individuals’ beliefs about knowledge and 
learning and how those beliefs changed over time. According to Perry, at the beginning 
of their college years, students are dualistic in holding a right or wrong, absolute view 
and belief that truth can be known and the role of the teacher is to communicate it. 
Students believe that simple and unchangeable facts are handed down by omniscient 
authority. By the time they reach their senior year, students turn to more realistic in 
believing that complex and tentative knowledge is derived from reason and empirical 
inquiry. Therefore, Perry hypothesized nine developmental positions classified into four 
categories that served as the path from being a dualistic thinker in early college years to 
being a committed relativistic thinker at the end of the four-year college experience.
Since Perry (1970) developed his unidimensional intellectual development model, 
educationalists and psychologists have attempted different models (Hofer, 2004a) to 
examine personal beliefs about the nature of knowledge that may influence 
comprehension (Schommer, 1990), cognitive processing (Kardash & Howell, 2000), and 
conceptual change learning (Qian & Alverman, 2000). Different approaches are used in 
the conceptualization and investigation of personal beliefs. The reflective judgment 
model (King & Kitchener, 1994) was based on 20 years of both cross-section and 
longitudinal research involving interviews with individuals from high school age through 
adulthood. The model was developed into a seven-stage developmental path traversing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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three levels—pre-reflective, quasi-reflective, and reflective—for understanding the 
assumptions related to individuals’ judgments about ill-structured problems. The 
embedded systemic model (Perry, 1970; Ryan, 1984; Schommer-Aikins 2004) includes 
cultural relational views and addresses issues of reciprocal interaction. Schommer makes 
the assumption that epistemology should be viewed as a system of beliefs capable of 
being independently and asynchronously developed. Initially, Schommer created a five- 
belief taxonomy that includes beliefs about the following: 1) simple knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge consists of discrete facts), 2) certain knowledge (i.e., absolute knowledge 
exists and will eventually be known), 3) omniscient authority (i.e., authorities have access 
to otherwise inaccessible knowledge), 4) quick learning (i.e., learning occurs in a quick 
or not-at-all fashion), and 5) innate ability (i.e., the ability to acquire knowledge is 
endowed at birth). The epistemological reflection model (Baxter Magolda, 1992, 2001) is 
used widely in higher education for understanding the development of college students. 
Baxter Magolda (2002) identified this sequence of knowing: absolute, transitional, 
independent, and contextual, which was based on her epistemology study using 
interviews concerning gender. The epistemic metacognition (Kichener 1983; Kuhn, 
1999b) is commonly activated in the knowledge acquisition and construction in everyday 
learning. The model encompasses two aspects—Kitchener’s (1983) three-level model: 1) 
cognition, 2) metacognition, and 3) epistemic cognition, in which each level builds up a 
foundation for the next as well as a developmental model by Kuhn (1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 
2000b) that is known as “metaknowing,” categorized into these three levels: 1) 
metacognitive knowing, 2) metastrategic knowing, and 3) epistemological meta-knowing. 
Kuhn concludes that early epistemological meta-knowing begins in the transition “from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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simply knowing that something is true to evaluating whether it might be” (Kuhn, 2000b, 
p. 317). The “epistemological resources” (Hammer & Elby, 2000, 2002) are used to 
compare the various epistemological frameworks. Hammer and Elby identified resources 
for understanding the nature and sources of knowledge, (knowledge as propagated stuff, 
knowledge as free creation, and knowledge as fabricated stuff), and epistemological 
activities, (accumulation, formation, and checking). Bendixen and Rule (2004) 
synthesized findings from a variety of studies to propose a more integrated model in an 
attempt to provide a guiding framework for addressing some of the key issues raised by 
diverse models. The model elaborates on the following fundamental elements of personal 
epistemology: 1) a mechanism of change (i.e., epistemic doubt, epistemic volition, and 
resolution strategies), 2) dimensions of beliefs, 3) advanced beliefs, 4) metacognition, 5) 
conditions for change (i.e., dissonance and personal relevance), 6) affect, 7) cognitive 
abilities and environment, and 8) reciprocal causation.
By summarizing and commenting upon recent research on epistemological beliefs, 
Schraw (2001) suggests that more research should be completed to investigate the links 
between epistemological beliefs and cognitive and motivational outcomes. It is necessary 
to better understand how epistemological beliefs affect complex cognitive processes such 
as problem solving, moral reasoning, and decision making in that the sophistication of 
epistemological beliefs is related to a wide variety of reasoning skills, including 
argumentation skills (Kuhn, 1991), problem solving (Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Schraw 
et al., 1995), reading comprehension (Schommer, 1990), and moral reasoning (Bendixen 
etal., 1998).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Moral reasoning is a study in psychology that overlaps with moral philosophy. 
Perennial philosophical views of moral reasoning can be traced back to Confucius, 
Aristotle, Rousseau and Rawls, but in modem empirical research, the most prominent 
figure is Kohlberg, who, as a follower of Piaget, has identified a detailed stage sequence 
for moral reasoning by using moral dilemmas, or hypothetical situations in which people 
have to make decisions (Crain, 2005). Kohlberg defines moral reasoning as judgment 
about right and wrong, which, according to Rest et al. (1999b), relates to a person’s 
cognitive development.
Kohlberg’s (1984) theories on cognitive-moral development emerged from the 
cognitive development understandings introduced by Piaget (1965), together with 
Kantian concepts of justice that emerged from the work of Rawls (1971). Kohlberg’s 
work identified six stages in the development of moral reasoning grouped into three 
major levels. The progression through the stages reflects individuals’ cognitive 
development in the understanding of moral issues. The progression depends on the 
broadening cognitive capacity to understand the perspective of others. Kohlbergian 
theories, according to Rest et al. (1986, 1999; Narvaez, 2002), are most useful for issues 
of “macromorality,” which concerns the formal structure of society as defined by 
institutions, rules, and roles.
Following Kohlberg’s system to represent logical moral reasoning, Rest at el. 
(1986, 1999; Narvaez, 2002) developed a neo-Kohlbergian perspective based on 25 years 
of data collection with the Defining Issues Test. Rest introduces (1999a, 1999b) the 
concept of “micromorality,” which concerns the particular face-to-face relations that 
people have in everyday life. Rest (1999) defines cognitive structures in terms of schemas
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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rather than stages, reformulating the definition of postconventional moral thinking, and 
using different research strategies.
Since Kolhberg, a small number of researchers (Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle, 
1998; King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002) have undertaken the examination of the 
relationship between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs among individuals. The 
results of a number of the studies (Bendixen et al., 1998) confirmed the hypothesis that 
five epistemological dimensions (simple knowledge, certain knowledge, omniscient 
authority, quick learning, and innate ability) would explain unique variance in moral 
reasoning above and beyond all other variables such as age, education, gender, syllogistic 
reasoning skills, grade point average and academic major; in other words, multiple 
epistemic assumptions play important roles in college students’ moral reasoning.
In his dissertation to investigate a cultural variation of relationships between 
epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning, Jeong (2003) identified three assumptions 
about the development of epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning that share 
psychological and philosophical assumptions concerning constructivism and a cognitive 
developmental perspective. The first basic assumption underlying epistemological and 
moral development is that human beings construct meaning for themselves by thinking 
about and acting on the world (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). A second basic assumption is 
that they fit a cognitive-developmental pattern. A third is that most research focuses on 
the development of epistemological cognition and moral judgment during the collegiate 
years.
Buehl and Alexander (2001) suggested that epistemological beliefs are 1) 
multidimensional and multi-layered in nature, 2) significantly related to other learning
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
outcomes, and 3) characterized both as domain general and domain specific. Bendixen et 
al. (1998) investigated the relationship between epistemic beliefs and moral reasoning 
based on their predictions that, 1) gender, age, education, and syllogistic reasoning scores 
collectively would explain a significant proportion of the variance in principled moral 
reasoning scores using the P index from Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT); 2) age 
and education would be related to epistemic beliefs (Perry, 1970; Benack & Basseches, 
1989; Schommer, 1990, 1993; Walker et al. 1991); and 3) several of the epistemic beliefs 
would explain a significant proportion of the variance in the DIT over and above the 
effects of social and personal variables. Bendixen et al. (1998) focused on these two 
questions: 1) whether epistemic beliefs are related to moral reasoning over and above the 
effects of other critical variables such as age, education, gender, and basic reasoning 
skills; and 2) the dimensionality of epistemic beliefs. Their findings support both of these 
predictions.
In addition to the measures of beliefs (Durell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001) such as 
the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) developed by Schraw et al. (2002), based on 
Schommer’s (1990) Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) and Syllogisms, the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT), developed by Rest (1979), was used in their research in order for 
beliefs corresponding to simple knowledge, certain knowledge, omniscient authority, and 
quick learning each to explain the significant variation in performance on the DIT.
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979, 1986), based on Kohlberg’s (1975) 
interview method, has been used extensively as a surrogate measure of levels of 
principled moral reasoning. The DIT has three versions—the long form which consists of 
six separate scenarios (Heinz and the Drug, Escaped Prisoner, Newspaper, Doctor’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Dilemma, Webster, Student Take-over), the short form that includes three scenarios 
(Heinz and the Drug, Escaped Prisoner, and Doctor’s Dilemma), and the newer version 
DIT-2 (Rest et al., 1998; 1999) with five vignettes (Famine, Reporter, School Board, 
Cancer, and Demonstration), the latter being better-validated and more widely-used. The 
score on the DITs, which ranges from 0 to 95, measures the subject’s reasoning level 
according to the cognitive moral development theory of Kohlberg.
Unfortunately, these investigations appear to have a methodological problem, 
namely, the use of interviews and questionnaires with college students who are, by and 
large, from the United Sates, so less is known about other populations around the world. 
Although some researchers (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Rest, 1986; Snarey, 1985) have 
attempted cross-cultural studies of moral reasoning or epistemological beliefs 
respectively, very few of them have touched the examination of the relationship between 
moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs (Bendixen et al., 1998; Jeong, 2003), and 
none of them has conducted a cross-cultural study of moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs and the relationships between moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs with mainland Chinese samples. It is due to the uniqueness of this 
population group that the author is interested in examining cultural differences and 
similarities in moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs and in the relationships of 
epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning between American and Chinese college 
students.
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Statement of the Problem
As the economic and diplomatic climate in China has changed, there has been a 
noticeable increase in the frequency of contact between Chinese and Americans in all 
areas—business and economic, academic and scientific, professional and cultural. The 
trade volume of the United States and China grows, and the demand for cultural 
exchanges between two nations has been rising, for the governments of the two countries 
have realized the importance of fostering a broader and deeper understanding between 
two peoples; for instance, on December 9, 2003, the governments of the United States of 
America and the People’s Republic of China signed a renewed Implementing Accord for 
Cultural Exchange. As the United States interacts with China with increasing frequency, 
the need to anticipate and to analyze change becomes paramount, the change concomitant 
with China’s societal transition characterized by the formation of the market economy, 
the impact of globalization, mass media and the Internet, cultural diversity and value 
pluralism, trends toward democratization in politics, and structural changes in the family 
(Perry et al., 2001; Qi & Tang, 2004). One effective vehicle which can help the world 
understand such a change is to better understand individuals’ moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs—in educational settings, students’ perspective of viewing 
knowledge and making moral decisions.
As a means to conduct cross-cultural comparison, according to Buehl (2003), 
countries or sub-cultures are often categorized along these four cultural dimensions: 1) 
individualism/collectivism, 2) masculinity/femininity, 3) large power distance/small
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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power distance, and 4) weak uncertainty avoidance/strong uncertainty avoidance 
(Hofstede, 1980). According to Hofstede’s cultural index, the United States and China 
agree in Uncertainty Avoidance Index (46 for the U.S. and 40 for China, with the range 
from 8 to 112) and Masculinity Index (62 for the U.S. and 66 for China, with the range 
from 5 to 95), whereas the two countries differ in the index of Power Distance (40 for the 
U.S. and 80 for China, with the range from 11 to 104), Individualism (91 for the U.S. and 
20 for China, with the range from 6 to 91), and Long-Term Orientation (29 for the U.S. 
and 118 for China, with the range from 16 to 118).
Researchers tend to contrast cultures that differ along the individualism or 
collectivism dimension, the one commonly viewed as “the single most important 
dimension of cultural difference in social behavior” (Triandis, 1985). Individualistic 
cultures (e.g., the United States and Western Europe) tend to focus on the goals and rights 
of the individual over those of the larger group and heavily emphasize autonomy, 
competition, independence, self-initiative, and self-reliance (Triandis, 1990). In contrast, 
collectivist cultures (e.g., Asia, Africa, and South America) are characterized by “the 
subordination of individual goals to the goals of the collective, a sense of harmony, 
interdependence and concern for others” (Hui & Triandis, 1986, pp. 244-245). In a 
collectivist context, individuals view themselves in terms of their relationships with 
others and are respectful of perceived duties, obligations, and in-group norms 
(Matsumoto & Juang, 2004).
Individualism is a dominant value in the United States, a country considered 
multiracial and built on Judeo-Christian principles, whilst China, a nation characterized 
by its value of collectivism, is a populous country accounting for one-fifth of the world
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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human population. Traditionally influenced by Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist moral 
teachings, episodic with Maoist moral ideology from thel950s to the 1980s, China is 
transforming itself into a market economic system in which moral values become implicit 
and pluralistic (Madsen, 1984, 1995; Seckington, 2002; Li et al., 2004; Qi & Tang, 2004; 
Wang, 2004). Contemporary studies examining relationships between individuals’ 
epistemological beliefs and their moral judgments have primarily utilized interviews and 
a questionnaire method with American college students, but less is known about other 
populations.
Some authors (Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Hofer, 2001) have suggested that 
epistemological beliefs may differ considerably across cultures. Research is particularly 
needed in this area, in that differences between American and Asians schools may be 
differences in beliefs about the complexity of knowledge and speed of learning 
(Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). A recent study done by Jeong (2003) explored the 
relationships between epistemological beliefs and moral judgment between American and 
Korean college students. China is the most populous country in the world, with its unique 
traditions and current practices, and for the many reasons enumerated in the preceding 
paragraphs it will be of importance to investigate cultural differences and similarities in 
the relationships between epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning between American 
and Chinese college students.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
Research Questions
In order to investigate the cultural differences of epistemological beliefs and moral 
reasoning between American and Chinese college students, the research questions of this 
study are as follows:
1) Are there differences in moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs between 
American and Chinese college students?
2) Do gender and ethnicity affect moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs 
between American and Chinese college students?
3) Is there any interaction between ethnicity and gender in moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs?
Significance of the Study
There is a need to understand the role of culture in the area of epistemological 
beliefs and moral reasoning. Is the current research literature on epistemological beliefs 
and moral reasoning relevant to students from different cultures? An understanding of 
cultural influences on epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning would be helpful in 
applying the current knowledge of epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning to 
educational settings with students from different cultures. With this end in mind, by 
selecting college student samples from the two nations, each unique in cultural setting, a 
cross-cultural study of students’ epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning will help 
educators and prospective teachers understand their students, benefit policy makers in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
developing adaptive programs to enhance more cultural exchanges and provide 
curriculum developers with a cultural consciousness and a global perspective.
If the results of this study indicate that no differences exist in epistemological 
beliefs and moral reasoning under the two different cultural settings, the author might 
suggest that the educators from the two nations attend to universal aspects of their 
students’ moral development and epistemological beliefs instead of focusing on 
articulating cultural variation and diversification. Further, if the conclusion of the present 
study suggests that considerable overlap exists in psychological functioning across 
cultures, it may provide evidence in support of Kohlberg’s model of cognitive and moral 
development in the debate between cultural psychologists and Kohlbergians. In contrast, 
if this study shows that there are significant differences in the Chinese and American 
cultural settings, cultural influences on students’ moral development and epistemological 
beliefs must be taken into account, which may provide evidence in support of cultural 
psychologists in the area of moral development.
Given that all the participants in this study will be education majors in the United 
States and from a normal university oriented to the teaching profession in China, the 
results of this study also have implications for pre-service teacher education. Today’s 
education students are tomorrow’s teachers, and allowing them such a consciousness and 
a perspective for understanding student epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning will 
increase their sensibility and awareness, facilitating them in their real life after their 
graduation to enhance harmony and to reduce conflicts among the future society.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction
This chapter has been divided into four sections. The first section synthesizes the 
major theories of moral judgment, from Aristotle in late 300 BC to Rest in the 20 
century, followed by a critical review of cross-cultural research in the development of 
moral reasoning. The second section summarizes an overview of current theories of 
epistemological development, categorized from developmental model to integrated model, 
and then, reviews cross-cultural studies of epistemological theories. The third section 
describes research of moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs and research on the 
relationship between epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning. The fourth and final 
section covers the measurement of epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning.
Educational Theories on Moral Reasoning
Moral reasoning is an ancient topic, much discussed by philosophers. Confucius 
believed that humanity is naturally good, and this belief is the logical starting point of 
ancient Chinese ideas about the development of moral reasoning. Confucian traditions 
attributed “four beginnings” to human personality, which naturally unfolded into defining 
human virtues—benevolence, righteousness, courteousness and wisdom (Puka, 2005). 
These virtues, however, need cultivation and training through the environment and 
education if one wants to grow these moral seeds into actual moral character.
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Aristotle focuses on habituation of moral virtues. Strands of natural growth and 
moral evolution are embedded throughout his depiction of human flourishing. For 
Aristotle, moral happiness or flourishing is the fulfillment of our natural human function. 
The “Aristotelean Principle” of cognitive motivation is one such strand, moving 
individuals to prefer more complex to less complex activities. This motivation, according 
to Aristotle, pulls individuals toward greater challenges and resulting cognitive growth in 
dealing with them over time. The development of the intellectual virtues is largely a 
process of natural growth toward natural function, and some of these virtues, logos and 
sophrosune especially, play necessary roles in the proper expression of moral virtues 
(Puka, 2005).
Recent philosophical history has given a rare nod to moral reasoning through 
Rawls’s (1972) A Theory o f Justice. Like Kant before him, Rawls paid homage to 
Rousseau’s vision of moral cooperation. Such cooperation is nature’s way of humanizing 
and civilizing the human race, not merely of institutionalizing humanity’s civilizing 
intent to stabilize and protect it. We see in Rawls’s hands the degree to which supporting 
moral prescriptions with psychological proclivities has retreated under threats from the 
naturalistic fallacy, and other categorical mistakes. Rawls recognizes only the logical 
requirement that just social institutions remain compatible with the facts of human 
psychology and its development so that socializing each successive generation injustice 
institutions will be a feasible enterprise, assuring compliance. He does not turn to moral 
development for moral support, grounding value prescriptions on its facts.
From an educational perspective, according to Puente (1998), many hypotheses 
for explaining cognitive and moral development are based on the following three theories:
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the romantic theory, the cultural transmission theory and the cognitive-developmental 
theory. The third theory will be the focus of this dissertation.
The romantic theory, which prevailed in the 19th century, was categorized with 
the expression principle and the freedom principle revealed in J.J. Rousseau’s Emile and 
organic-genetic theory whose main proponent is Freud. For Rousseau, the integral 
development of the subject physically, intellectually and emotionally is accepted as a 
fundamental commitment within this theoretical approach. Thus, the school and the 
family must design environments that facilitate the development of all the potentialities 
possessed innately by learners. For Freud, the psychological theory conceives the child’s 
mind as an organism, or plant, biologically prepared to grow as long as the environment 
nurtures its development. From the psychological point of view, the theory conceives that 
moral development occurs in a manner that parallels physical development, and there are 
a series of stages related to psycho-sexual development. These stages are basically 
hereditary, though there are some social factors that could favor or delay their expression. 
Therefore, moral development depends on the natural and spontaneous evolution of 
impulses and emotions (Puente, 1998).
The cultural transmission theory, inspired by associationism whose relevant 
representatives are Locke, Watson, Thorndike, and Skinner, conceives the mind as a 
“tabula rasa” or blank slate upon which the experiences of the environment are inscribed. 
The mind is initially empty and passive, determined by factors from the physical and 
social environment. Concepts and structures are a reflection of all that is outside the 
individual in the physical and social world. The individual’s development is brought 
about through direct instruction or through the imitation of adult models with emphasis
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on the acquisition of knowledge, abilities and skills. The acquisition of moral behavior is 
governed by the same general principles of learning. The origin of morality is not the 
individual, but society (Puente, 1998).
The cognitive-developmental theory is dialectical since it rejects the dichotomy 
between maturity or innate factors and environmental factors. Both have a role in the 
person’s definition and both function in an articulated way; otherwise, there may be 
factors that delay both cognitive and moral development. Sometimes, certain innate 
factors begin to conflict with environmental factors, and from their resolution more 
advanced phases of development and more mature moral behaviors emerge (Puente, 
1998).
The cognitive-developmental theory originated with Plato, was given a new 
meaning by Hegel and, lastly, was incorporated into the psychological point of view by 
Dewey and Piaget. Piaget and Dewey claim that mature thinking depends neither on 
genetic nor social factors; rather, it is the result of the reorganization of the psychological 
structures derived from the interaction between the organism and the environment. To 
understand Piaget and Dewey it is necessary to clarify the concept of cognition (Puente, 
1998).
Cognitions are structures internally organized as a system of relations and as a set 
of beliefs. These structures are rules for the processing of information that an organism 
receives or for the connection of several events. Children’s events and experiences are 
organized and actively processed; this is not merely a process of repetition or 
accumulation (Puente, 1998).
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Cognitive development, defined as change in the cognitive structures, supposedly 
depends on experience. However, such effects are not considered as learning in the 
classical sense (training, instruction, modeling or practice). For example, if two events 
are presented in temporal proximity, it is probable that the child interprets the 
phenomenon in terms of a category as causality and not in terms of a simple associative 
relation. Simple associations can help to generate a structure, but this is basically 
“internal” and “stable”, though “modifiable” (Puente, 1998).
Cognitive Development and Moral Reasoning
Among the first psychologists directly relevant to contemporary theories of the 
development of moral reasoning, Piaget is best known for organizing cognitive 
development into a series of stages—the levels of development from infancy through 
childhood to adolescence. These four stages are labeled the Sensorimotor stage, the 
Preoperational stage, the Concrete Operational stage, and the Formal Operational stage. 
“Advancement through these levels was explained through biology and culture along 
with a ‘third factor’ called equilibration, working inter-dependently with the other two”. 
The characteristics of each stage are illustrated in the following table.
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Table 1. Stages of Cognitive Judgment (Piaget)
Stage Characterized by
Sensorimotor Differentiates self from objects
(Birth-2 years) Recognizes self as agent o f action and begins to act intentionally: e.g. pulls 
a string to set mobile in motion or shakes a rattle to make a noise 
Achieves object permanence: realizes that things continue to exist even 
when no longer present to the sense
Preoperational Leams to use language and to represent objects by images and words
(2-7 years) Thinking is still egocentric: has difficulty taking the viewpoint o f others 
Classifies objects by a single feature: e.g. groups together all the red 
blocks regardless o f shape or all the square blocks regardless o f color
Concrete operational Can think logically about objects and events
(7-11 years) Achieves conservation o f number (age 6), mass (age 7), and weight (age 
9)
Classifies objects according to several features and can order them in 
series along a single dimension such as size.
Formal operational Can think logically about abstract propositions and test hypotheses
(11 years and up) systematically
Becomes concerned with the hypothetical, the future, and ideological 
problems
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In addition to his work in the area of cognitive development, Piaget also wrote 
about moral reasoning. According to Piaget’s two-stage moral reasoning theory, the age 
of ten or eleven years to children serves as a dividing line to think about moral dilemmas 
differently—younger children regard rules as fixed and absolute, exhibiting a sense of 
moral realism while older children look at rules as more relativistic. They show a sense of 
moral relativism. For younger children, moral decisions and games are based on fixed 
rules coming from adults or God—authority figures that determine what is right or wrong. 
This is called the “heteronomous” stage of moral reasoning, characterized by a strict 
adherence to rules, duties, and obedience to authority. For older children, situations and 
intentions are taken into account when making moral judgment. They understand that it is 
permissible to change rules if everyone agrees. Rules are not sacred and absolute but are 
devices that humans use to get along cooperatively. As children consider these situations, 
they develop toward an “autonomous” stage of moral reasoning, characterized by the 
ability to consider rules critically and selectively apply these rules based on a goal of 
mutual respect and cooperation. Younger children base their moral judgments primarily 
on consequences, whereas older children base their judgments on intentions. When, for 
example, the young child hears about one boy who broke 15 cups trying to help his 
mother and another boy who broke only one cup trying to steal cookies, the young child 
thinks that the first boy did worse. The child primarily considers the amount of damage— 
the consequences—whereas the older child is more likely to judge wrongness in terms of 
the motives underlying the act (Piaget, 1965).
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Cognitive-Moral Reasoning
Kohlberg ’s Six Stages o f Moral Reasoning
Kohlberg’s (1984) theories on cognitive-moral reasoning emerged from the 
cognitive development understandings introduced by Piaget (1965, 1997) together with 
Kantian concepts of justice that emerged from the work of Rawls (1971). Consistent with 
Piaget, Kohlberg proposed that children form ways of thinking through their experiences 
that include understandings of moral concepts such as justice, rights, equality and human 
welfare. Kohlberg followed the development of moral reasoning beyond the ages studied 
by Piaget, and determined that the process of attaining moral maturity took longer and 
was more gradual than Piaget had proposed.
On the basis of his research, Kohlberg identified six stages of moral reasoning 
grouped into three major levels: 1) pre-conventional: judgment is exclusively based on 
self-needs and perceptions; 2) conventional: judgments take into account the expectations 
of the society and of the law; and 3) post-conventional: judgments are based on principles 
that go beyond the specific law (Table 2).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
Table 2. Six Stages of Moral Reasoning
Level Stage Orientation
Pre-conventional 1 Obedience and punishment
2 Self-interest
Conventional 3 Interpersonal accord and conformity (a.k.a. The good boy/good 
girl attitude)
4 Authority and social-order maintaining (a.k.a. Law and order 
morality)
Post-conventional 5 Social contract
6 Universal ethical principles (a.k.a. Principled conscience)
Each level represented a fundamental shift in the social-moral perspective of the 
individual. At the first level, the pre-conventional level, a person’s moral reasoning is 
characterized by a concrete, individual perspective. Within this level, a Stage 1 
heteronomous orientation seeks to avoid breaking rules that are backed by punishment, 
obedience for its own sake and avoiding the physical consequences of an action to 
persons and property. As in Piaget’s framework, the moral reasoning of Stage 1 is 
characterized by a concrete and egocentric perspective. At Stage 2 there is the early 
emergence of moral reciprocity. The Stage 2 orientation focuses on the instrumental, 
pragmatic value of an action. Reciprocity is of the form, but is more a matter of “quid pro
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quo” exchanges than gratitude, loyalty or justice. The Golden Rule becomes, “You 
scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.”
Individuals at the conventional level of reasoning, however, have a basic 
understanding of conventional morality and reason with an understanding that norms and 
conventions are necessary to uphold society. They tend to be self-identified with these 
rules and uphold them consistently, viewing morality as acting in accordance with what 
society defines as right. Within this level, individuals at Stage 3 are aware of shared 
feelings, agreements, and expectations that take primacy over individual interests.
Persons at Stage 3 define what is right in terms of what is expected by people close to 
one’s self, and in terms of the stereotypic roles that define being good. Being good means 
having good motives, showing concern about others; it also means keeping mutual 
relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude. The perspective is that of the 
local community or family. Behavior is judged by intentions for the first time, but there is 
not as yet a consideration of the generalized social system. Stage 4 marks the shift from 
defining what is right in terms of local norms and role expectations to defining right in 
terms of the laws and norms established by the larger social system, with individuals 
more broadly concerned with society as a whole. This is the “member of society” 
perspective in which one is moral by fulfilling the actual duties defining one’s social 
responsibilities.
Finally, at the post conventional level, moral reasoning is based on an 
understanding of the principles of just and social cooperation that underlie the norms and 
laws of society, using a “prior to society” perspective. While two stages have been 
presented within the theory, only one, Stage 5, has received substantial empirical support.
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Stage 6 remains as a theoretical endpoint that rationally follows from the preceding 5 
stages. In essence, this last level of moral judgment entails reasoning rooted in the moral 
fairness principles from which moral laws would be devised. Laws are evaluated in terms 
of their coherence with basic principles of fairness rather than upheld simply on the basis 
of their place within an existing social order. Thus, there is an understanding that 
elements of morality such as regard for life and human welfare transcend particular 
cultures and societies and are to be upheld irrespective of other conventions or normative 
obligations. These stages (1-5) have been empirically supported by findings from 
longitudinal and cross-cultural research (Power et al., 1989).
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Content o f Stage






Stage 1 -  Heteronomous 
Morality
To avoid breaking rules 
backed by punishment, 
obedience for its own 
sake, and avoiding 
physical damage to 
persons and property
Avoidance of 
punishment, and the 
superior power o f  
authorities
Egocentric point o f view. 
Doesn’t consider the 
interests o f others or 
recognize that they differ 
from the actor’s; doesn’t 
relate two points o f view. 
Actions are considered 
physically rather than in 
terms o f  psychological 
interests o f others. 
Confusion o f authority’s 
perspective with one’s 
own.
Stage 2 -  Individualism, 
Instrumental Purpose, and 
Exchange
Following rules only 
when it is to someone’s 
immediate interest; acting 
to meet one’s own 
interests and needs and 
letting others do the 
same. Right is also what’s 
fair, what’s an equal 
exchange, a deal, an 
agreement.
To serve one’s own needs 
or interests in a world 
where you have to 
recognize that other 
people have their 
interests, too.
Concrete individualistic 
perspective. Aware that 
everybody has his own 
interests to pursue and 
these conflict, so that 
right is relative (in the 
concrete individualistic 
sense).
LEVEL 2 -  
CONVENTIONAL 




Living up to what is 
expected by people close 
to you or what people 
generally expect o f  
people in your role as 
son, brother, friend, etc. 
“Being good” is 
important and means 
having good motives, 
showing concern about 
others. It also means 
keeping mutual 
relationships, such as 
trust, loyalty, respect and 
gratitude.
The need to be a good 
person in your own eyes 
and those o f others. Your 
caring for others. Beliefs 
in the Golden Rule. 
Desire to maintain rules 
and authority which 
support stereotypical 
good behavior.
Perspective o f the 
individual in relationships 
with other individuals. 
Aware o f  shared feelings, 
agreements, and 
expectations which take 
primacy over individual 
interests. Relates points 
o f view through the 
concrete Golden Rule, 
putting yourself in the 
other guy’s shoes. Does 
not yet consider 
generalized system 
perspective.
Stage 4 -  Social System and 
Conscience
Fulfilling the actual 
duties to which you have
To keep the institution 
going as a whole, to
Differentiates societal 
point o f view from
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agreed. Laws are to be avoid the breakdown in interpersonal agreement
upheld except in extreme the system “if  everyone or motives.
cases where they conflict did it,” or the imperative Takes the point o f  view of
with other fixed social o f conscience to meet the system that defines
duties. Right is also one’s defined obligations roles and rules.
contributing to society, (Easily confused with Considers individual
the group, or institution. Stage 3 belief in rules and relations in terms o f place
-




Stage 5 -  Social Contact or
Utility and Individual Rights
Being aware that people 
hold a variety o f values 
and opinions, that most 
values and rules are 
relative to your group. 
These relative rules 
should usually be upheld, 
however, in the interest o f 
impartiality and because 
they are the social 
contract. Some non- 
relative values and rights 
like life and liberty, 
however, must be upheld 
in any society and 
regardless o f majority 
opinion.
A sense o f  obligation to 
law because o f  one’s 
social contract to make 
and abide by laws for the 
welfare o f  all and for the 
protection o f  all people’s 
rights. A  feeling o f  
contractual commitment, 
freely entered upon, to 
family, friendship, trust, 
and work obligations. 
Concern that laws and 
duties be based on 
rational calculation o f  
overall utility, “the 




Perspective o f  a rational 
individual aware o f  
values and rights prior to 
social attachments and 
contracts. Integrates 
perspectives by formal 
mechanisms of  
agreement, contract, 
objective impartiality, and 
due process.
Considers moral and legal 
points o f view; recognizes 
that they sometimes 
conflict and finds it 
difficult to integrate them.




Particular laws or social 
agreements are usually 
valid because they rest on 
such principles. When 
laws violate these 
principles, one acts in 
accordance with the 
principle. Principles are 
universal principles o f 
justice: the equality of  
human rights and respect 
for the dignity o f human 
beings as individual 
persons.
The belief as a rational 
person in the validity of 
universal moral 
principles, and a sense of 
personal commitment to 
them.
Perspective o f  a moral 
point o f view from which 
social arrangements 
derive.
Perspective is that o f any 
rational individual 
recognizing the nature o f 
morality or the fact that 
persons are ends in 
themselves and must be 
treated as such.
From L. Kohlberg, “Moral Stages and Moralization” (pp. 34-35). In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral Development 
and Behavior, 1976, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
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Moral Reasoning Components and Schemas (Rest et al)
Rest (1979) developed a four-component model describing the process most 
individuals use in moral decision-making and behavior. Lapsley (1996) concludes that 
multi-process models, such as Rest’s four-component model, may be necessary “to 
improve our understanding of moral reasoning” (p. 105). The four-component model 
depicts how these cognitive structures combine to lead to one’s reasoning processes when 
presented with a moral dilemma.
Rest’s Four Component Model (Rest & Narvaez, 1994) of moral behavior has 
been used as a framework for various professional moral education and research 
programs (Bebeau, 1994; Duckett & Ryden, 1994). The model describes moral behavior 
as a process, including (1) moral sensitivity, interpreting a social situation, (2) moral 
judgment, deciding which action is the most appropriate moral action, (3) moral 
motivation, prioritizing moral values over other values, and (4) moral action, having the 
ego strength, persistence, and implementation skills to carry out the moral behavior. 
According to the theory, one must be competent in each of those inner psychological 
processes in order to carry out a moral action. The strength of this model is in its 
comprehensiveness, for it takes into account other facets of human behavior besides 
reasoning or judgment.
Studies of component I of Rest’s Four-Component Model indicate several 
findings. First, studies have shown that many people have difficulty identifying moral 
dilemmas (e.g. Staub, 1978). Studies have also found differences among people in their 
sensitivity to the needs and welfare of others. Bebeau et al. (1982) developed a moral
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sensitivity scoring system to indicate a person’s ability to identify a moral dilemma. A 
low moral sensitivity score means an individual is unaware of the moral issue and focuses 
primarily on technical problems.
Component II of Rest’s model focuses on determining the appropriate course of 
moral behavior or action. Prescriptive reasoning is defined as “the consideration of what 
should be done to appropriately handle a moral dilemma” (Rest, 1979). Component II 
research is based on the cognitive stages of moral development developed by Kohlberg 
(1969) and extended upon by Rest (1979). Cognitive moral development posits that 
individuals advance along a stage-sequence continuum in their moral development. 
Cognitive moral development theory assumes that an individual with lower order moral 
reasoning is incapable of processing higher order moral reasoning (Rest, 1979, 1986).
Component III focuses on deciding what one should do when presented with a 
moral dilemma. Deliberative reasoning is defined as determining ‘what will actually be 
done’ to handle a moral dilemma (Rest, 1979). Component IV involves execution of the 
moral plan.
Rest et al. share the core assumptions of Kohlberg’s “cognitive-developmental” 
approach which emphasizes rationality, constructivism, individual development and the 
shift from Conventional to Postconventional Thinking. They also share Kohlberg’s other 
assumptions that
• people use justice-based thinking to make decisions about moral dilemmas,
• moral thinking can influence behavior,
• moral thinking develops in complexity as a result of age and education 
(particularly higher education), and
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• Stages 5-6 (Postconventional thinking) exist and can be measured
Following Kohlberg’s system to represent logical moral reasoning, Rest at el. 
(1986, 1999; Narvaez, 2002) developed a neo-Kohlbergian perspective based on 25 years 
of data collection with the Defining Issues Test. Rest introduces (1999a, 1999b) the 
concept of “micromorality” which concerns the particular face-to-face relations that 
people have in everyday life. Kohlbergian theories are most useful for issues of 
“macromorality” which concerns the formal structure of society, as defined by 
institutions, rules, and roles. Neo-Kohlbergian theory followed Kohlberg’s approach to 
conceptualizing moral judgment by emphasizing 1) rationality, 2) constructivism, 3) 
individual development, and 4) shift from conventional to post-conventional thinking and 
by keeping the following Kohlbergian assumptions: 1) that people use justice-based 
thinking to make decisions about moral dilemmas, 2) that moral thinking can influence 
behavior, 3) that moral thinking develops in complexity as result of age and education, 
and 4) that Stage 5-6 (Post-conventional thinking) exist and can be measured.
Derived from Kohlberg’s approach, the Defining Issues Test (DIT) makes several 
departures, for example, in defining cognitive structures in terms of schemas rather than 
stages, reformulating the definition of postconventional moral thinking, and using 
different research strategies to develop an empirical foundation. Rather than using the 
term “moral stages”, neo-Kohlbergians prefer “moral schemas” which are thought to be 
more concrete. The following three structures in moral reasoning development are 
postulated: the Personal Interests Schema, which derives from Kohlberg’s Stages 2 and 3;
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the Maintaining Norms Schema, which derives from Kohlberg’s Stage 4; and the Post- 
conventional Schema, which derives from Kohlberg’s Stage 5 and Stage 6.
Individuals at the Personal Interests Schema show their concerns for those with 
whom they have an affectionate relationship, as in elements described by Kohlbergian 
Stages 2 and 3, not worrying about organizing cooperation on a society-wide basis. The 
Personal Interests Schema does not entail a socio-centric perspective. With the 
Maintaining Norms Schema, however, individuals can be more advanced in attaining a 
socio-centric perspective, not only considering people who are friends, kin, or well- 
known acquaintances. The elements the Maintaining Norms Schema contains: 1) the 
perceived need for generally-accepted social norms to govern a collective; 2) the 
necessity that norms apply society-wide, to all people in a society; 3) the need for the 
norms to be clear, uniform, and categorical (rule of law); 4) the norms are seen as 
establishing a reciprocity; and 5) the establishment of hierarchical role structures, of 
chains of command, of authority and duty. One is expected to obey authorities, not 
necessarily out of respect for the personal qualities of the authority, but out of respect for 
the social system. Morality is defined by maintaining the established social order, and 
“law” is connected to “order” in a moral sense. With the Post-conventional Schema, 
essential to moral reasoning is that moral obligations are to be based on shared ideals, are 
fully reciprocal, and are open to scrutiny. Moral consensus at this schema is achieved by 
appealing to ideals and logical coherence whilst the strategy of the Maintaining Norms 
Schema is to gain moral consensus by appealing to established practice and existing 
authority. Therefore, developmentally, the Post-conventional Schema is more advanced 
than the Maintaining Norms Schema.
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Summary and Critique
The most outstanding characteristics of the cognitive-developmental approach are 
found in notions such as stages of development, sequential organization, and in a certain 
congruence between biological, intellectual and moral development. The development of 
moral reasoning, according to Piaget, is a direct consequence of cognitive development: 
the moral cannot be understood or explained without a complete comprehension of the 
cognitive. Kohlberg conceives that the stages of moral judgment are hierarchical, and a 
person who progresses to a higher stage of moral reasoning cannot skip stages. For 
example, a person cannot jump from being concerned mostly with peer opinions (stage 
three) to being a proponent of social contracts (stage five). However, when persons 
encounter a moral dilemma and find their current level of moral reasoning unsatisfactory, 
they will look to the next level. Discovery of the limitations of the current stage of 
thinking promotes moral development.
One criticism of Kohlberg’s theory is that it emphasizes justice to the exclusion of 
other values, specifically, it may not adequately address the arguments of people who 
value other moral aspects of actions. Gilligan (1982) has argued that Kohlberg’s theory is 
overly androcentric, pointing out that his theory was the result of empirical research using 
only male participants. Gilligan argued that Kohlberg’s theory therefore did not 
adequately reflect the concerns of women. She developed an alternative theory of moral 
reasoning that is based on the value of care. Although recent research has generally not 
found any gender differences in moral development, Gilligan’s theory illustrates that
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theories on moral development need not focus on the value of justice. Other moral 
philosophers have challenged the assumption of universality of Kohlberg’s stages of 
moral development, seeing morality is a social construction. By a social construction, it 
means that morality is not constructed in the mind of any one individual—as individual 
cognitive operations—but is negotiated among individuals, deliberated, and arrived at 
through agreement. Common morality might be different for different communities (and 
therefore relative), but the common morality can be debated and scrutinized by members 
of the community to reflect an equilibrium between the ideals of a community and moral 
intuitions about specific cases.
A neo-Kohlbergian approach emerged from a research team headed by Rest (1999) 
who modified Kohlberg’s original theory in several ways, for example, emphasizing 
schema theory, changing the concept of development, reconceptualizing 
postconventionality, changing research strategy in several ways, to propose a new 
synthesis of ideas, providing new perspectives in the field of morality.
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The Review of Cross-Cultural Research in Moral Reasoning
Since Kohlberg, researchers have continued to ask questions concerning cultural 
influences on moral reasoning. Do cultural influences have an effect on moral reasoning 
and judgment? Different studies have been launched to verify the universality versus the 
uniqueness of moral development. Longitudinal studies (e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & 
Lieberman, 1983; Page, 1981; Walker, 1989) and cross-cultural research (Boyes & 
Walker, 1988; Rest, 1986; Snarey, 1985, Edwards, 1987; Gielen, 1990, 1991) support the 
validity and universality of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. Not surprisingly, 
however, some social scientists (Bloom, 1977; Buck-Morss, 1975; Edwards, 1975, 1982) 
dispute the hypothesis of the universality and permanence of the sequences of moral 
development. They consider moral development as culturally bound, since different 
values are determined by the ideological and political principles of a culture, as well as 
the environment and other factors.
In a review of 45 Kohlbergian moral judgment studies in 27 countries, Snarey 
(1985) concluded that the content of moral reasoning appears to be relative to socio­
cultural context and that the deep structure underlying and operating on the content tends 
to be universal. Moreover, provided that the deep structure can be developmentally 
differentiated into stages, these stages and their developmental sequence are also 
universal. Snarey further suggested that only on the preconventional and conventional 
levels in the Kohlbergian model of moral reasoning has consensus been reached among 
researchers so far as universality is concerned. Still at issue is whether principled or 
postconventional moral reasoning is universal.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
In Damon’s (1977) study of children’s reasoning concerning fair distribution and 
legitimate authority, it has been reported that at least stages 1 through 3 were in evidence. 
In the three studies (Wark & Kreb, 1996; Miller, 1990, 1992; Bersoff, 1993) comparing 
American and Indian moral development it becomes evident that understanding moral 
reasoning is a very complex endeavor. However universally the underlying processes of 
moral reasoning might extend, cultural influences have a partial impact on development.
With respect to Chinese culture, Ma (1988, 1992) constructed a developmental 
model of moral judgment using the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1975) by integrating 
Piaget’s, Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984), as well as the Chinese perspectives on moral 
development based on Confucianism and Taoism. Ma concluded that the initial three 
stages were universal, but the final three stages of moral development were influenced by 
cultural contexts.
In a study investigating developmental changes in moral reasoning about sibling 
and parental relationships in Mainland Chinese children, Fang et al. (2003) found that the 
result suggested universal stage-like progression in moral judgment from superficial 
(stages 1 and 2) to profound (stage 3), and that culture-specific moral reasoning also 
existed. For example, in comparison to children in Kohlberg’s studies, Chinese children’s 
moral decisions emphasized respect for authority, altruism, and concern over their 
siblings’ moral correctness. The authors argued that Chinese children’s moral 
characteristics are influenced by the cultural context.
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Summary and Critique
Studies that used cognitive developmental approaches in researching the 
development of moral reasoning revealed that the deep structure underlying and 
operating on morally problematic situations tends to be similar, whereas studies that used 
psychosocial approaches showed the importance of cultural factors (e.g., interpersonal 
relationship oriented) in moral development. These findings suggest that psychosocial 
development in group-oriented cultures such as China differs from development in 
individualistic cultures such as the United States.




Kohlberg’s (1958) basic interview consists of a series of dilemmas including 
“Heinz Steals the Drug”. His core sample was comprised of 72 boys at the ages of 10,13, 
and 16 from both middle- and lower-class families in Chicago. Later, boys and girls from 
other American cities and from other countries were added to his sample (1963, 1970).
Not really interested in whether the subject says “yes” or “no” to this dilemma, 
Kohlberg’s interest is in the reasoning behind the answer—why the subject thinks Heinz 
should or should not have stolen the drug. The interview is conducted to ask new 
questions which helped researchers understand the child’s reasoning. For example, the 
interview asks children if Heinz had a right to steal the drug, if he was violating the 
druggist’s rights, and what sentence the judge should give him once he was caught. Once 
again, the main concern is with the reasoning behind the answers. The interview then 
continues to give more dilemmas in order to get a good sampling of a subject’s moral 
thinking.
After he had classified the various responses into stages, Kohlberg wanted to 
check the reliability of his classification through interrater reliability. In particular, he 
wanted to know if others would score the protocols in the same way. Other judges 
independently scored a sample of responses, and he calculated the degree to which all 
raters agreed. Kohlberg found these agreements to be high, as he has in his subsequent
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work, but whenever investigators use Kohlberg’s interview, they also should check for 
interrater reliability before scoring the entire sample.
A lengthy interview (Moral Judgment Interview) is required to determine the 
moral reasoning stage of the respondent, which is problematic in many respects. One of 
the main problems with the MJI is that it depended on the respondent’s ability to 
articulate their reasons for their decisions. This required a self-awareness that most 
people -  especially children -  do not possess. To correct the “verbal ability” problem and 
to make Kohlberg’s stages more testable, Rest developed a pencil-and-paper Defining 
Issues Test, which was much easier to administer and did not require that the respondent 
verbalize the reasons for specific choices.
Defining Issues Test
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979; 1986), which is based on Kohlberg’s 
(1975) interview method, has been extensively used as a surrogate measure of levels of 
principled moral reasoning. Based on Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, DIT 
research is built on the assumption that “developmental stages of moral judgment involve 
distinctive ways of defining social moral dilemmas and of evaluating crucial issues in 
them” (Rest, 1979, p.85). The DIT has three versions—the long form which consists of 
six separate scenarios (Heinz and the Drug, Escaped Prisoner, Newspaper, Doctor’s 
Dilemma, Webster, Student Take-over), the short form that includes three scenarios 
(Heinz and the Drug, Escaped Prisoner, and Doctor’s Dilemma), and the newer version 
DIT-2 (Rest et al., 1998; 1999) with five vignettes (Famine, Reporter, School Board,
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Cancer, and Demonstration), which is better-validated and more widely-used. The score 
on the DITs, which ranges from 0 to 95, measures the subject’s reasoning level according 
to Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory.
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is an objective test, compared with traditional 
assessment of stages from cognitive development theories, like Kohlberg’s, involving a 
clinical interview for the participants to be presented with a dilemma and to be asked to 
make a decision. In traditional assessments, the scoring depends largely on the nature of 
explanation, which makes it difficult to perform because it requires well-trained 
interviewers. This kind of assessment is very time-consuming and expensive. Compared 
with traditional assessment in the form of interview, The DIT is easier to use. Six 
dilemmas in the long form are similar to those used in Kohlberg’s interview but printed 
on the page, along with 12 questions. Participants are asked to rate how important each 
question is in making their decisions, what their decision is, and then to rank the four 
most important questions. These four most important items are the only items that enter 
into the scoring. From the test the researcher gains a P scor e (percentage of principled 
thinking) and a D score (a composite needing computer scoring to calculate), as well as 
checks for consistency and the number of meaningless items the subject checks. These 
items are written as lofty and pretentious sounding but are meaningless. Too high a score 
indicates that the subject does not understand test directions. The test requires a reading 
age of approximately 12-13 years. The original DIT remained unchanged for over twenty 
years and is cited in over 400 published articles (Rest et al., 1999).
As found in a review of the DIT by Sutton (1992), the reliability of the DIT is 
good. Test-retest correlations range from .71 to .82 for the P index, and .67 to .92 for the
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D index. For a shorter three-story test version test-retest correlations range from .58 
to .77 for the P index, and .63 to .83 for the D index. The values for Cronbach’s alpha 
are .77 for the P score and .79 for the D score. Alpha values for the shorter version 
are .76 for the P score and .71 for the D score. To establish criterion-group validity, mean 
scores for graduate students in moral philosophy and political science, college students, 
senior high school students, and ninth grade students were compared. Significant 
differences were found between the groups. Any developmental measure should show 
longitudinal change in the direction of higher stages. Significant upward trends over 6 
years and four testings (F = 17.6, pc.OOOl) for the P score are reported. Research has 
indicated that individuals are unable to fake good on the DIT. Additional information in 
the manual may be found on validation studies related to experimental enhancement, and 
multidimensional scaling and latent trait analysis. Normative data provided in the manual 
are very extensive. These data are broken down by educational level—junior high, high 
school, college, professional school and graduates, and nonstudent adults. Scores on the 
DIT are correlated positively with education, IQ, and age (for student groups). 
Interestingly, no consistent relationship has been found with DIT scores and gender, 
socioeconomic status, and college major.
The Defining Issues Test (DIT-2) is an updated version of the DIT in which Rest and 
his colleagues (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) have used schema theory to 
interpret DIT-2 scores. It consists of five social problems to which participants respond.
• “Famine”- a father contemplates stealing food for his starving family from the 
warehouse of a rich man hoarding food- comparable to the Heinz dilemma in 
DIT-1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
• “Reporter”- a newspaper reporter must decide whether to report a damaging story 
about a political candidate- comparable to the prisoner dilemma in DIT-1.
• “School Board”- a school board chair must decide whether to hold a contentious 
and dangerous open meeting- comparable to the newspaper dilemma in DIT-1.
• “Cancer”- a doctor must decide whether to give an overdose of a painkiller to a 
frail patient-comparable to the doctor dilemma in DIT-1.
• “Demonstration”- college students demonstrate against U.S. foreign policy- 
comparable to the students’ dilemma in DIT-1.
The N2 measure was also developed by Rest et al. (1999) for calculating a moral 
developmental score. The DIT-N2 score is comparable to DIT1- P score or principled 
reasoning score. Rest et al. (1997) reported that the N2 index has superior performance in 
comparison to the traditional P index. In order to determine the DIT2’s validity, Rest et 
al., (1999) administered the DIT1 and the DIT2 to a sample of 200 participants 
representing four different age and educational levels. The results indicate that the DIT2- 
N2 measure has higher validity characteristics on the three criteria compared to the DIT1- 
P-score. The results also indicate a high correlation (.71) between the DIT-1 and DIT-2.
The DIT-1 and DIT-2 also use different methods to ensure participant reliability 
checks. The DIT1 contains four standard checks to assess participants’ responses. These 
checks are designed to address the following problems commonly found when using the 
DIT-1 in empirical research: 1) random responding, 2) missing data, 3) alien test-taking 
sets, and 4) nondiscrimination of items. Although the DIT2 performs the same standard 
checks, Rest et al., (1999) incorporated cut-off points for weighted rank-rate 
inconsistencies to decrease the number of unreliable participants. Rest et al., (1999)
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reports a loss of 8 (4%) participants using the new checks in the DIT-2 compared to a 
loss of 46 (23%) participants using the standard checks in the DIT1.
Overall, the increased validity and reliability results are attributed to the DIT-2’s 
new methods of analyzing the data. Rest et al., (1999) emphasizes the practical research 
advantages that the DIT2 has by reducing the number of purged participants compared to 
the DIT-1. As previously mentioned, the DIT-2 updates the dilemmas and issue 
statements, shortens the test, and has clearer instructions compared to the DIT-1. The 
results from this study may contribute to existing ethics research by providing further 
information on the usefulness of the DIT-2 in accounting ethics research.
Critique o f the DIT
The problems with this test are associated with its age. Two of the dilemmas in 
the test involve real issues surrounding the Vietnam war. To high school and college 
students, these are obviously not completely hypothetical dilemmas, but they are not part 
of their personal memory (or, perhaps, interest). One dilemma is the classic case of 
whether Heinz should steal to get money for drugs to save his wife’s life. This dilemma 
has been summarized and reprinted so widely that it may be difficult to find a group of 
naive college graduates, or even undergraduates. The lack of norms and discussion of 
moral reasoning for U.S. ethnic minority groups, always a serious omission, appears 
more glaring in the 1990s because of the increased number of minorities in the country. 
Cognitive developmental theory, which assumes that a stage reflects a level of reasoning 
that can be generalized across situations and content, is challenged with recent work. In
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particular, researchers are more likely to assume that reasoning or problem solving is 
domain specific. While the test developer, Rest, takes a “soft” stage position, his test 
gives a summary score of principled thinking, not separate scores within domains. In 
contrast, separate moral developmental histories have been proposed in rights versus 
conventional rules (Turiel, 1983) or friendship, justice, fairness, obedience and authority, 
and social rules and conventions (Damon, 1977). However, easy-to-use tests are not 
available for these newer approaches. In summary, in many aspects this test is a model of 
instrument development in social sciences. It has good psychometric properties, a full and 
informative manual, is easy to administer, is inexpensive, and was based on an 
established theory. There are a wealth of data on the use of the DIT including two 
detailed books by Rest (Rest, 1979, 1986). However, the test is dated and so should be 
used with caution, especially with ethnically diverse groups.
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The Development of Epistemological Beliefs
The Historic Views o f Epistemological Beliefs
Epistemology, the study of knowledge and knowing, according to Buehl and 
Alexander (2001), has been one of the cornerstones of philosophy. The term, derived 
from Greek episteme (i.e. knowledge) and logos (i.e. explanation), has remained a taproot 
of philosophical inquiry for centuries. Plato, in his Theaetus, explored the elemental 
components of knowledge as truth, belief and justification. Kant (1781) differentiated 
between a priori knowledge (i.e. what we know prior to experience) and a posterior 
knowledge (i.e. what we know based on experience), distinguishing the rational 
knowledge from the empirical knowledge. He argued that a prior knowledge is 1) logical 
and necessary, 2) not derivable from particular sensations and experiences, 3) 
presupposed in all our experiences, and 4) contributed by our mind. James (1890), Peirce 
(1877), Dewey (1916), and Whitehead (1967) indicated in their writings a psychological 
turn in issues related to knowledge and knowing.
The Models o f Studying Epistemological Beliefs
Development Model. The contemporary study of personal epistemology began 
with the groundbreaking work of Perry (1970), whose research was based on his team 
interviewing Harvard undergraduates for four years. Using the open-ended and 
nondirective longitudinal interviews and a paper-and pencil instrument—the Checklist of
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Educational Views (CLEV), they explored each individual’s beliefs about knowledge and 
learning and how they change over time. At the beginning of their college years, students 
are dualistic in holding a right or wrong, absolute view and belief that truth can be known 
and the role of the teacher is to communicate it. Students believe that simple and 
unchangeable facts are handed down by omniscient authority. By the time they reach 
their senior year, students turn to more realistic in believing that complex and tentative 
knowledge is derived from reason and empirical inquiry. Therefore, Perry hypothesized 
nine developmental positions classified into four categories that serve as the path from 
being a dualistic thinker in early college years to being a committed relativistic thinker at 
the end of the four-year college experience.
Critique o f the Development Model. The territory of epistemological beliefs long 
has been of interest to philosophers, but its paradigm shift owes much to the interest of 
current psychologists’ empirical research. The work of Perry and his research team, in 
their interviews, identified the nine positions of students’ epistemological development 
that were classified into four categories. His work suggested that college students 
changed their beliefs in simple, unchanging knowledge that is handed down by authority 
into their beliefs in complex, tentative knowledge coming from reasoning and empirical 
evidence as these students reach their senior year. Although the focus of the Perry 
scheme is on understanding epistemology in the situated context of learning, his is not on 
studying epistemological beliefs per se (Moore, 2002). Glenberg and Epstein (1987) 
failed to find Perry’s conceptualization useful in that Perry’s epistemic scheme is a 
unidimensional measure linked with students’ cognition. Additionally, Schommer and 
Walker (1997) believed that unidimensional approach to epistemological beliefs does not
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adequately capture the nature of personal epistemology. Hofer (2001) indicated that 
Perry’s sample had been predominately male and from an elite institution.
Reflective Judgment Model. Building on Perry’s unidimensional intellectual 
development model, Kitchener and King (1981) described the Reflective Judgment 
Model to trace young people and adult intellectual development (King and Kitchener, 
1994). They proposed a three-level cognitive processing model: cognition, metacognition, 
and epistemic cognition and later modified as a general approach to the study of 
epistemology—the Reflective Judgment Model (RJM) with seven stages in three levels 
(King and Kitchener, 2002). The first level is Pre-reflective Thinking (Stage 1, 2 and 3); 
in this level, individuals are unlikely to perceive that problems exist for which there may 
be no correct answer. For example, in Stage 1, knowledge is expected to exist absolutely 
and correctly, and it can be obtained with certainty by direct observation. “I know what I 
have seen.” In Stage 2, knowledge is viewed as absolutely certain or certain but not 
immediately available, and it can be obtained through sense or via authority figures. “If it 
is on the news, it has to be true.” And in Stage 3, knowledge is assumed to be temporary 
uncertain, and only personal beliefs can be known. “When there is evidence that people 
can give to convince everybody one way or another, then it will be knowledge; until then, 
it’s just a guess.” The second level is Quasi-reflective Thinking (Stage 4 and 5), and in 
this level one has a growing realization that she cannot know with certainty, for example, 
in Stage 4, knowledge becomes uncertain and knowledge claims idiosyncratic. “I’d be 
more inclined to believe evolution if they had proof. It’s just like the pyramids: I don’t 
think we’ll ever know. Who are you going to ask? No one was there.” and in Stage 5, 
knowledge is contextual and subjective. “People think differently and so they attack the
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problem differently. Other theories could be as true as my own, but based on different 
evidence.” The third level, Reflective Thinking, includes Stage 6 and Stage 7 in which 
knowledge is actively constructed and must be understood contextually. “It’s very 
difficult in this life to be sure. These are degrees of sureness. You come to a point at 
which you are sure enough for a personal stance on the issue”, (Stage 6) and, “One can 
judge an argument by how well thought-out the positions are, what kinds of reasoning 
and evidence are used to support it, and how consistent the way one argues on this topic 
is as compared with other topics” (Stage 7). “Reflective judgment delineates the 
development of the process of knowing and reasoning.”(Hofer, 2001, p. 358). The later 
stages of knowing are regarded as more mature, because they allow individuals to use 
more alternatives to solve different kinds of problems.
Critique o f the Reflective Judgment Model. Unlike Perry whose model focuses 
primarily on the nature of knowledge, the reflective judgment model developed by King 
and Kitchener (1994) delineates the development of the process of knowing and 
reasoning. The model adopts a developmental approach to understand the epistemic 
assumptions that are related to individuals’ judgments about ill-structured problems 
(Hofer, 2004a). Yet, many questions about the internal coherence of the reflective model 
of epistemic cognition remain unanswered. For example, Dove (1990) independently 
examined scores of the reflective model and found the predicated consistency across 
stages. However, the issue has not been independently explored in the later stages. 
Similarly, Scott’s (1994) work suggests that there may be stylistic differences in 
individuals’ approaches to epistemic assumptions within levels. Furthermore, Wood’s 
(1997) extensive secondary analysis and findings from DeBord’s (1993) study suggest
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that there may be a context effect for some dilemmas for some individuals. Again, these 
data should be verified and extended to other stages.
Embedded System Model. By extending the work of Perry (1970) and Spiro
(1989), Schommer (1990, 1994) developed an “embedded system model” to describe the 
basic elements of the epistemological belief system. Previous researchers conceptualized 
epistemological beliefs as a highly complex yet unidimensional entity or focused on 
unique aspects under a rubric of personal epistemology. As an alternative, Schommer
(1990) proposed that epistemological beliefs would better be reconceptualized as a 
system of more-or-less independent beliefs. System of belief means that epistemological 
beliefs are multidimensional, and there is more than one belief to consider. A five-belief 
taxonomy that Schommer created includes beliefs about 1) simple knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge consists of discrete facts), 2) certain knowledge (i.e., absolute knowledge 
exists and will eventually be known), 3) omniscient authority (i.e., authorities have access 
to otherwise inaccessible knowledge), 4) quick learning (i.e., learning occurs in a quick 
or not-at-all fashion), and 5) innate ability (i.e., the ability to acquire knowledge is 
endowed at birth). These original hypothesized beliefs included beliefs about the 
following: (a) the structure of knowledge (ranging from isolated bits and pieces to 
integrated concepts), (b) the stability of knowledge (ranging from unchanging to 
continually changing), (c) the source of knowledge (ranging from handed down by 
authority to derived from empirical evidence and reasoning), (d) the speed of learning 
(ranging from quick all-or-none to gradual), and (e) the ability to learn (ranging from 
fixed at birth to improvable over time and experience). “More-or-less independent” refers 
to the assumption that all beliefs may not develop at the same rate and are sometimes
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inconsistent. For example, at some point in time an individual may hold extreme beliefs 
of isolated knowledge and certain knowledge. As development occurs, an individual may 
come to believe that knowledge is highly interrelated, yet still maintain the notion of 
certainty of knowledge. The most important point of Schommer’s theory is that one 
cannot simply assume that epistemological beliefs are in sync. This is particularly true 
when individuals are changing their epistemological beliefs.
Epistemological Reflection Model. Based on intensive interviews with young 
adults ranging from age of 18 to 30, Baxter Magolda (1992, 2001) developed the 
epistemological reflection model, used widely for understanding the development of 
college students. Baxter Magolda sees epistemology as focus on the nature of learning as 
situated in the college classroom context and less on assumptions about knowledge 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 98). Describing her model based on assumptions as socially 
constructed and context bounded (Baxter Magolda, 2002, p.91), Baxter Magolda 
identified this sequence of four ways of knowing: 1) absolute knowing—receiving or 
mastering knowledge (knowledge is certain and obtained from authorities), 2) transitional 
knowing—interpersonal and impersonal patterns (knowledge is partially certain and 
requires understanding), 3) independent knowing—interindividual and individual patterns 
(knowledge is uncertain and requires independent thinking or individual challenging), 
and 4) contextual knowing—intergrating relational and impersonal knowing in the 
postcollege students (knowledge is judged on evidence with context). Gender 
perspectives also played a role in her study. She concluded that the overall pattern of 
development of the nature of knowledge for men and women may be similar, gender- 
related patterns of knowing may appear in early stages and then converge. Males adopted
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more “impersonal” and “individualist” ways of knowing, and women more “personal” 
and “interindividualist” ways of knowing.
Critique o f the Epistemological Reflection Model. Gender does play a role in 
Baxter Magolda’s epistemological study. Compared to earlier theories, Baxter MgoIda’s 
study also provides more contextual information to inform instructional practices (Duell 
& Schommer, 2001), and Baxter Magolda’s approach concerning the role of the learner, 
role of peers, role of instructor, and evaluation enriches the study of personal 
epistemology. Yet, in the development and articulation of her model, Baxter Magolda 
addressed a number of beliefs that were not necessarily epistemological in nature, i.e., 
beliefs about the role of the learner, peers, and instructor, and beliefs about evaluation, 
although Baxter Magolda’s assessment of beliefs is the most academically focused.
Rather than distill students’ beliefs about knowledge from these broad responses, Baxter 
Magolda includes beliefs about the role of the learner, peers, and instructor, and beliefs 
about evaluation in her overall descriptions of each way of knowing. Such beliefs are 
indeed important and informative, but according to Buehl and Alexander (2001), it seems 
misleading to use the term Epistemological Reflection Model when so many other belief 
systems are intertwined.
Metacognition Model. Hofer (2004b) has conceptualized personal
epistemology in one of two primary ways—either as a cognitive developmental process 
or as a system of beliefs. Building on the work of Flavell (1979), Kitchener (1983), and 
Kuhn (1999b), the metacognition model conceives of epistemological understanding as a 
metacognitive process that activates epistemic theories, a multidimensional set of 
interrelated beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Epistemic understanding might be
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understood best in its relation to metacognition (Flavell, 1979), defined in its broadest 
sense as knowing about knowing. According to Flavell (1979, 1987), metacognition 
consists of both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences or regulation. 
Metacognitive knowledge, which consists of person variables, task variables and strategy 
variables, refers to acquired knowledge about cognitive processes, knowledge that can be 
used to control cognitive processes. Kitchener (1983) developed this three-level model: 1) 
cognition, 2) metacognition, and 3) epistemic cognition, in which each level builds a 
foundation for the next. Level 1 includes cognitive processes such as computing, reading, 
and perceiving; Level 2 contains the metacognitive processes that permit knowledge 
about cognitive tasks, in particular the application of strategies and a monitoring of their 
use. Level 3, in conjunction with the first two, involves the monitoring of the epistemic 
nature of problem solving, including an awareness of the limits and certainty of knowing, 
and the criteria involved in the process of knowing. This process is particularly critical, 
according to Kitchener, in the solving of ill-structured problems. Developmentally, 
epistemic cognition emerges in late adolescence but continues to evolve during adult 
years.
Metaknowing, a developmental model provided by Kuhn (1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 
2000b) includes these three levels: 1) metacognitive knowing, 2) metastrategic knowing, 
and 3) epistemological meta-knowing. Metacognitive knowing refers to knowing about 
declarative knowledge, or knowing about knowledge as a product. Metastrategic knowing 
refers to knowing about procedural knowing, or knowing about knowing as a process.
The more abstract process of knowing about knowledge and knowing is classified as 
epistemological meta-knowing. Early epistemological meta-knowing begins in the
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transition “from simply knowing that something is true to evaluating whether it might be” 
(Kuhn, 2000b, p. 317). In summary, viewing epistemological thinking as an advanced 
form of meta-knowing provides greater clarity and precision to the construct.
Critique o f the Metacognition Model. Based on Kitchener’s (1983) 
epistemic cognition and Kuhn”s (1999a, 1999b) epistemological meta-knowing, both of 
which encompass “knowing about knowing,” Hofer (2004b) describes this approach as a 
process of epistemic monitoring and evaluation in addressing ill-structured problems 
(King & Kitchener, 1994), in argumentation about complex problems (Kuhn, 1991), and 
in the knowledge acquisition and construction process taking place in everyday learning, 
both in and out of school.
Epistemological Resources Model. Hammer and Elby (2002) developed an 
epistemological resources model to challenge both the levels and methods of analysis 
implied by the structure of existing models of personal epistemology, as well as the 
suggested intra-individual consistency across contexts. Beliefs might be consistent within 
a context, for example, within a certain subject, particular physics course (Hammer,
1994); but not across contexts, for example, a physics class and a psychology class, or, 
moreover, a physics class and interpersonal relationships.
Critique o f the Epistemological Resources Model. Based on work of those who 
engaged in research on science instruction, this epistemological resources model offers a 
view of personal epistemology that is more situational and less stable or trait-like. More 
work is needed to test this model, which shows considerable promise in advancing the 
conceptions of personal epistemology and better integrating such conceptions with 
developing understanding of the situated nature of cognition (Brown et al., 1989). It is
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likely that beliefs about each of the dimensions of knowledge and knowing might differ 
not only from a physics to a psychology class, but from one physics class to another 
physics class, depending on such things as the beliefs of the teacher and how these are 
instantiated in classroom tasks and pedagogy (Hofer and Pintrich, 1999).
Integrated Model. Although different areas of research have different well- 
articulated models that promote theory testing and discussion of educational implications, 
some researchers, like Schraw (2001), are concerned that “there is not a unified model of 
epistemological understanding to guide research, nor is there a single model that clearly 
articulates the relationship among epistemological world views, epistemological beliefs, 
and how those beliefs change and develop. As a result, little is known about the origin 
and development of individuals’ epistemological beliefs.” Schraw (2001) expected that 
“an integrated model of epistemological beliefs is necessary if  research is to make the 
transition from descriptive to prescriptive accounts of epistemology.”
By synthesizing a collection of articles that addresses several of the important 
issues in research on personal epistemology, Bendixen and Rule (2004) propose a more 
integrated model that elaborates on the following fundamental elements of personal 
epistemology: (a) a mechanism of change (i.e., epistemic doubt, epistemic volition, and 
resolution strategies), (b) dimensions of beliefs, (c) advanced beliefs, (d) metacognition, 
(e) conditions for change (i.e., dissonance and personal relevance), (f) affect, (g) 
cognitive abilities and environment, and (h) reciprocal causation. In developing this 
model, they seek to integrate the diverse models of personal epistemology to guide and 
inform future research and educational practice.
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Critique o f the Integrated Model. One of the contributions Bendixen and Rule
(2004) provided is their effort in developing an integrative approach as a guiding model 
by integrating the diverse models of personal epistemology to guide and inform future 
research and educational practice. Considering the complicacy—the diversity and 
dynamics of the nature of epistemology in terms of its dimensions and domains, it seems 
a difficult task to develop a comprehensive and all-embracing model; rather, a guiding 
principle for further research in future is more in demand.
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(Baxter unidimensional, 2)transitional Reflection for understanding
Magolda) Epistemological knowing, 3) (MER)—a the development
transformations independent standardized of college
as part of the act knowing, 4) open-ended students
of meaning- contextual questionnaire
making knowing with a
standardized
protocol
Reflective Developmental 3 Levels: 1. Reflective To understand the
judgment model approach, Pre-reflective Judgment epistemic
(King & unidimensional (stage 1,2, and Interview assumptions that
Kitchener) 3), 2. Quasi- are related to
reflective (stage individuals’
4 and 5), 3. judgments about
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(stage 6 and 7) problems
Embedded Describes basic 1) Stability of 1. Schomer’s 5- Includes cultural
systemic model elements of the knowledge, 2) point Likert- relational views
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belief system as knowledge, 3) questionnaire issues of
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Ability to Belief
Learn, 5) source Inventory (EBI)
of knowledge
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Epistemological Beliefs: Its Cross-Cultural Context
One of the major research problems that has been ignored in the epistemological 
beliefs literature is based on the fact that there exists potential cross-cultural variability in 
epistemological beliefs (Chan & Elliot, 2004; Schraw, 2001). Most recent studies on 
epistemological beliefs have been conducted in North American contexts where 
independent, democratic and pluralistic values are dominated and individualism is highly 
valued in the society. In contrast to this epistemological orientation in these pluralistic 
academic and social communities, a few authors have speculated on the potential 
differences in epistemological beliefs in other cultural contexts (Ballard & Clanchy,
1991; Lee, 1995; Qian & Pan, 2002).
Youn et al. (2001) investigated the nature of epistemological beliefs about 
learning by analyzing the type of factors involved in the epistemological development of 
South Korean high school students. In literature reviews they found that previous studies 
on the epistemological development of American high school students suggested that 
American students’ learning beliefs are related positively with their age, amount of 
formal education, and academic achievement. By multiple regression analysis, their 
study, however, showed that no such relationships were identified in the South Korean 
sample except between students’ beliefs and their academic achievement. These results 
reconfirmed the culture-specific nature of epistemological beliefs, which was identified 
from previous comparative studies with South Korean and American college students 
(Youn, Kim, & Yang, 1999; Youn, 2000).
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In one of the first studies of the relationship between cultural relational views and 
epistemological beliefs, Tasaki (2001) found that whether students’ endorsement of an 
independent or interdependent self-construal had important implications for which 
epistemological beliefs they endorsed. Tasaki (2001) obtained a sample of 692 
multiethnic students from a number of imiversifies in the United States. One of the 
institutions included was the University of Hawaii, a school which has a large population 
of Asian and Asian American students. Tasaki (2001) was particularly interested in the 
possible influence of Asian cultural beliefs such as collectivism, and, consequently self- 
construal, on epistemological beliefs. Epistemological beliefs were measured using a 
modified version of Schommer’s Epistemological Beliefs Inventory (Schommer, 1990). 
Tasaki (2001) found a number of significant relationships between self-construal and the 
epistemological beliefs of certainty o f knowledge, omniscient authority, rigid learning, 
and innate ability. Students who endorsed an interdependent self-construal displayed a 
stronger belief in omniscient authority, certainty of knowledge, rigid learning, and innate 
ability. Students who endorsed an independent self-construal were more likely to believe 
that knowledge is uncertain and evolving and to have weaker beliefs in omniscient 
authority. These findings are significant, because the current literature on epistemological 
beliefs would characterize students with interdependent self-construals (and the 
consequent epistemological beliefs) as being less sophisticated in their epistemological 
thinking. Tasaki (2001) suggests that this finding may indicate that western educational 
systems that promote certain epistemological beliefs may be biased against students from 
nonwestem cultures who approach educational experiences with a unique culturally- 
based epistemology.
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With respect to the epistemological development in a Chinese culture, Chan 
(2003a) and Chan and Elliot (2003) explored epistemological beliefs among teacher 
education students in a non-western culture—specifically, Chinese students in Hong 
Kong. Chan and Elliot (2003) examined the factor structure of Schommer’s (1990) 63- 
item epistemological beliefs questionnaire with a sample of students of Chinese descent 
enrolled in the teacher education program of the Hong Kong Institute for Education.
Chan and Elliot hypothesized that the underlying dimensions of epistemological beliefs 
would differ among students raised in the Chinese culture. Specifically, the authors 
expected the dimension labeled source o f knowledge (omniscient authority) to be 
somewhat different because of the frequent references to the term ‘authority’ in Chinese 
culture.
Chan and Elliot (2003) administered the epistemological beliefs questionnaire to 
352 final-year students enrolled in teacher education. Using exploratory factor analysis, 
the authors found that the subscale for omniscient authority loaded highly (-.85 factor 
loading) on the certain knowledge factor, in contrast to the clear difference between these 
two dimensions when using the Schommer questionnaire with North American samples 
(Schommer, 1990). Schommer (1990) identified certain knowledge as a dimension, but 
not omniscient authority. In the Chan and Elliot (2003) sample, one dimension, named 
omniscient authority, combined the elements of certain knowledge and omniscient 
authority. The authors concluded that this difference in factor structure was likely due to 
“cultural/contextual factors (Chan & Elliot, 2003, p. 229).” They suggested that 
‘authority’ has a unique meaning in Asian/Chinese culture. In general, authorities are 
viewed with respect and admiration, and children are taught to revere the knowledge
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handed down by elders or experts. Chan and Elliot (2003) suggested that, perhaps, the 
unique developmental experiences of students raised in a Chinese cultural context 
influence the structure of their beliefs about knowledge. In addition to the differences in 
the dimension of omniscient authority, only three factors were identified, as opposed to 
Schommer’s (1990) four factors, and there were many subscales that loaded on more than 
one factor, making it difficult to clearly label the various factors. In all, Chan and Elliot 
(2003) identified a three-factor structure composed of Fixed/Innate Ability, Omniscient 
Authority/Certain Knowledge, and Certain Knowledge. Of all the factors, omniscient 
authority was the most prominent, indicating the possible important role of omniscient 
authority in Asian cultures.
In an extension of Chan and Elliot (2003), Chan (2003a) explored the relationship 
between epistemological beliefs and study approaches in a sample of 292 teacher 
education students in Hong Kong. Chan wanted to explore the nature of epistemological 
beliefs in a non-westem cultural context as well as the relationship between 
epistemological beliefs and “surface,” “deep,” and “achieving” study approaches (Marton 
& Saljo, 1976; Chan, 2003). A surface approach refers to a tendency to focus on 
reproducing or memorizing information. In contrast, a deep approach refers to a tendency 
to focus on understanding. Finally, an achieving approach is focused on attaining 
recognition and enhancing the ego. Of particular interest to the study of cultural 
influences on epistemological beliefs, Chan (2003a) found that the factor structure of 
epistemological beliefs in the sample of Hong Kong teacher education students was 
slightly different from Schommer’s (1990) results. Both Schommer (1990) and Chan 
(2003) studies identified the dimensions of innate/fixed ability and certainty o f
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knowledge. However, Chan (2003a) identified the dimensions of authority/expert 
knowledge and learning effort/process instead of the simple knowledge and quick 
learning dimensions that Schommer (1990) found. Chan does not elaborate on the 
specific differences between these dimensions, but does conclude that the dimensions are 
somewhat different in the particular cultural context of the study.
Chan (2003a) reported low but significant correlations (ranging from .12 to .21) 
between each of the epistemological dimensions (innate/fixed ability, learning 
effort/process, authority/expert knowledge, certainty knowledge) and “deep,” “surface,” 
and “achieving” study approaches. For example, belief in innate/fixed ability was 
significantly correlated (r = .21 >P< .001) with a surface approach to studying. Students 
who believed that the ability to learn was fixed at birth and not likely to change were 
more likely to pursue a surface approach to studying, with a focus on memorizing or 
reproducing information rather than understanding. As another example, belief in 
authority/expert knowledge was positively correlated (r = .19) with a surface approach 
and negatively correlated (r = -.17) with a deep approach. Chan concluded that 
epistemological beliefs were an important variable to consider when exploring students 
approaches to studying. In addition, Chan also concluded that “Hong Kong Chinese 
students tend to be deep and achieving-oriented in their learning approaches,” (Chan, 
2003, p. 45) in contrast to the claims of some researchers who conclude that Asian 
students “tend to rely on rote learning and a surface study approach.” (Chan, 2003a, p.
45)
In summary, current research on culture and epistemological beliefs (Youn, 2000; 
Chan, 2003a; Chan & Elliot, 2003) seems to support the view that cultural considerations
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must be taken into account when examining personal epistemology. Among students 
from different cultures, the underlying dimensions of epistemology may change, with 
corresponding differences in the way epistemological beliefs affect learning. Considering 
that in Hong Kong context students are exposed to the interactive influences of both 
traditional Chinese Confucian-heritage culture and Western philosophies, research 
exploring cultural differences in mainland Chinese samples’ epistemological beliefs is 
needed.
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Epistemological Beliefs Measurement
Various methods have been used to measure an individual’s epistemological 
beliefs ranging from a personal interview method to questionnaires. For example, Perry 
and his colleagues (1968) devised a 90 (later reduced to 46) Liket-type-item Checklist of 
Educational Views, a paper-and-pencil instrument, followed by an open-ended and 
nondirective interview, to measure “the degree of (students’) preference for black-white, 
right-wrong thinking in an authority-oriented outlook as against their preference for 
contingent, relativistic thinking in an outlook of greater individual judgment” (Perry,
1968, p. 101). The Reflective Judgment Interview was developed by King (1986), later 
paper-and-pencil measures recently developed by Kitchener et al. (1999), to measure 
individuals’ level within the seven stages of the Reflective Judgment Model. The 
Measure of Epistemological Reflection (MER), which is a standardized open-ended 
questionnaire with a standardized rating protocol (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Baxter 
Magolda & Porterfield, 1988) was developed to capture the patterns of epistemological 
thinking that are related to, but not determined by, gender. This instrument is helpful in 
comparing across groups. However, the open-ended questions require careful 
interpretation, which can be a time consuming and challenging task.
Among the instruments that have been developed to measure multi-dimensional 
aspects of a person’s beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing, the most 
reliable questionnaires are reported to be the Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) 
developed by Schommer (1990) and the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) conducted by 
Bendixen et al. (1998). The Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) is comprised of 63 items,
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representing twelve subscales or epistemological orientations. Initially, Schommer (1990) 
proposed five beliefs pertaining to Certain Knowledge (i.e., absolute knowledge exists 
and will eventually be known), Simple Knowledge (i.e., knowledge consists of discrete 
facts), Omniscient Authority (i.e., authorities have access to otherwise inaccessible 
knowledge), Quick Learning (i.e., learning occurs in a quick or not-at-all fashion), and 
Innate Ability (i.e., the ability to acquire knowledge is endowed at birth). These original 
hypothesized beliefs included beliefs about the following: 1) the structure of knowledge 
(ranging from isolated bits and pieces to integrated concepts), 2) the stability of 
knowledge (ranging from unchanging to continually changing), 3) the source of 
knowledge (ranging from handed down by authority to derived from empirical evidence 
and reasoning), 4) the speed of learning (ranging from quick all-or-none to gradual), and 
5) the ability to learn (ranging from fixed at birth to improvable over time and 
experience). Four of these five dimensions have been validated empirically as factors 
within the EQ (Schommer, 1990; Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes 1992; Schommer & 
Dunnell, 1994). The fifth dimension, source of knowledge, hypothesized by Schommer
(1990), has not yet been validated. This exclusion is important, given that researchers 
have postulated a relationship between beliefs about authority and skilled reasoning 
(Curtis, Billingslea, & Wilson, 1988; Damon, 1988; Jehng et al., 1993; Perry, 1970; 
Presley, 1985). The biggest contribution of Schommer’s EQ, as reviewed by Buehl and 
Alexander (2001), is that by devising a paper and pencil measure, it becomes possible to 
permit the efficient testing of large samples, allowing the application of more advanced 
statistical techniques in analyzing and modeling beliefs, and providing researchers the
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ability to examine epistemological beliefs in relation to other cognitive processes and 
learning outcomes.
In an effort to improve on Schommer’s questionnaire, Schraw et al. (1995) 
developed a 32-item instrument, the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI), to capture all five 
beliefs hypothesized by Schommer (1990) and to generate factor analysis in items. Items 
were simple statements about knowledge and learning. Participants respond on a 5-point 
Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Some new items were created 
by Schraw and his colleagues with a small percentage of the items very similar to 
Schommer’s. Later, the EBI was revised as a 25-item inventory by Bendixen et al. (1998) 
to measure five different factors regarding the nature of knowledge and the origins of 
individuals’ abilities. The items were answered on a six-point Likert scale instead of on a 
five-point Liket scale. Scores for each of the five subscales could range from five to 30.
The EQ and EBI were analyzed in two ways (Schraw et al., 2002). The first was a 
principal factor analysis with oblique rotation (i.e., correlated factors). The second was a 
principal factor analysis with varimax rotation. Because both oblique and varimax 
rotations led to highly similar solutions in which none of the factors were correlated 
above the traditional .30 level (Gorsuch, 1983), Schraw et al. reported only the principal 
factor analysis with varimax rotation solutions. The findings suggested these four 
conclusions: 1) the EQ and EBI instruments differ with respect to the number of factors 
they yield and the degree to which these factors match theoretical predictions, 2) 
differences exist with respect to the proportion of sample variance explained by the two 
instruments, 3) the EBI had better predictive validity than the EQ when correlated with a
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test of reading comprehension, and 4) the EBI had considerably better test-retest 
reliability than the EQ.
One of the problems in Schommer’s EQ is that it consistently yields a large 
number of potentially interpretable factors, each accounting for a relatively small share of 
total sample variation. A second difference between the two instruments concerned the 
proportion of sample variation the two instruments explained. The first five factors on the 
EQ explained 35.5% of total variation, while the EBI explained 60% of total sample 
variation. A one-month replication led to values of 39% and 64%, respectively. A third 
difference concerned construct validity, or the degree to which the two instruments, and 
their individual factors, measured the hypothesized constructs. One interpretative 
problem of the EQ is that it generated two Certain Knowledge factors. In comparison, the 
EBI did not have any obvious interpretive problems, in that each of the factors was 
conceptually distinct and all of the items that loaded on individual factors were related 
logically to the relevant construct. The EBI also had better predictive validity than the 
EQ. Four of the five factors from the EBI were modestly, though significantly, related to 
the test of reading comprehension. In contrast, none of the EQ factors was significantly 
correlated with total reading comprehension scores. The final difference was that the EBI 
yielded a close replication of factors between the initial and replication analyses, while 
the EQ did not. This indicated the EBI is more reliable over time than the EQ. For these 
reasons described above, the Bendixen et al. (1998) modifications are accepted for this 
study, and their measurement instrument is utilized in this study.
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Summary
Epistemology, as a philosophical concept, is concerned with the nature and 
justification of human knowledge. From a psychological and educational perspective, the 
focus of concern among those studying epistemological beliefs or epistemic cognition is 
how the individual develops conceptions of knowledge and knowing and utilizes them in 
developing understanding of the world. This concept includes beliefs about the definition 
of knowledge, how knowledge is constructed, how knowledge is evaluated, where 
knowledge resides, and how knowing occurs (Hofer, 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). 
Epistemological beliefs seem to develop with education from naive beliefs that certain, 
compartmentalized knowledge comes from a single source to beliefs that evolving, 
interrelated knowledge from multiple sources must be evaluated. Most research on 
epistemological beliefs centers on their development or the connection of students’ 
epistemological beliefs to academic success. This study extends the work in this area by 
examining the relationship among epistemological beliefs and previously unmeasured 
outcome variables such as moral reasoning, in a cross-cultural context.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
Studies on the Relationship between Epistemological Beliefs and Moral Reasoning
One of the groundbreaking studies on the relationship between epistemological 
beliefs and moral reasoning was done by Bendixen, Schraw and Dunkle (1998). These 
researches examined this by focusing on two questions overlooked by previous studies. 
The first was whether epistemic beliefs are related to moral reasoning over and above the 
effects of other critical variables such as age, education, gender, and basic reasoning 
skills. Bendixen, Schraw and Dunkle (1998) hypothesized that epistemic beliefs would 
explain a unique and significant proportion of variance beyond these other variables. The 
second question concerned the dimensionality of epistemic beliefs. The four predictions 
they made were: 1) gender, age, education, and syllogistic reasoning scores collectively 
would explain a significant proportion of the variance in principled moral reasoning 
scores using the P index from Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT), 2) age and 
education would be related to epistemic beliefs, 3) several of the epistemic beliefs would 
explain a significant proportion of the variance in the DIT over and above the effects of 
social and personal variables, and 4) individuals who held a strong belief in omniscient 
authority would score lower on the DIT. The participants, 100 female undergraduates and 
54 male undergraduates were given a 32-item Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI), a 12- 
item test of syllogistic reasoning, a brief demographic variable information sheet, and the 
Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979) to test these predictions.
The results of a regression analysis showed that 1) the gender variable reached 
significance, F (1, 139) = 19.09, MSE = 242.89, accounting for 12% of sample variation 
in P scores (i.e., r = .35); 2) neither the age nor the education variables reached
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significance once gender was entered into the equation; 3) syllogistic reasoning was 
significant, F (1,136) = 6.86, MSE = 234.91, accounting for 4% of additional sample 
variation; 4) all but one of the epistemic beliefs reached significance. The order of entry 
was simple knowledge, F (1,132) = 7.03, MSE = 224.94; certain knowledge, F (1,132) = 
5.48, MSE = 217.34; omniscient authority, F (1, 132) = 6.66, MSE = 208.89; and quick 
learning, F (1, 132) = 4.63, MSE = 203.33. These variables accounted for 4%, 3%, 4%, 
and 2% of the sample variation, respectively (i.e., 13% combined), over and above the 
variation explained by other variables.
These results confirmed the above predictions that specific epistemic beliefs such 
as simple knowledge were related to P scores once the effects of other variables were 
removed. Collectively, the four beliefs explained more variation in P scores than either 
gender, age, education, or syllogistic reasoning considered separately. Scores high on the 
simple knowledge, omniscient authority, and quick learning dimensions were correlated 
negatively with P scores, indicating that higher levels of principled moral reasoning were 
associated with a more sophisticated, and presumably less conventional, epistemic belief 
system. These findings demonstrated that epistemic beliefs make a unique contribution to 
moral reasoning, complementing the role of other variables such as gender, education, 
and individual cognitive skills, suggesting that the relative sophistication of one’s 
epistemic world view may impose a developmental constraint on one’s moral reasoning. 
Another finding suggested that simple knowledge, certain knowledge, omniscient 
authority, and quick learning each explained a significant proportion of variance over and 
above other variables, suggesting that moral decisions are related to a number of 
epistemic beliefs that may be independent of each other. This is consistent with the study
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of Schommer (1990, 1993), who found that ill-defined cognitive tasks were related to 
multiple epistemic beliefs.
Another similar study done by Jeong (2003) investigated cultural differences and 
similarities in the relationships between epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning, 
exploring whether cultural patterns existed in that relationships. The participants in 
Jeong’s study included 267 Korean undergraduate students and 214 U.S. counterparts. 
Each participant was provided with a packet that included 32-item Epistemic Beliefs 
Inventory (EBI), a 12-item test of syllogistic reasoning, a brief demographic variable 
information sheet, and the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979) short form.
Jeong’s (2003) study revealed similar results in the relationship between 
epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning between Korean and U.S. college students. 
First, the results indicated that the epistemological belief omniscient authority and GPA 
were the strongest predictors in Korean and U.S. college students’ P scores. Also, the 
analysis revealed that variables from the five epistemological predictors explained a 
substantial proportion of the variance in P scores over and above the effects of gender, 
age, education, GPA, academic major, and syllogistic reasoning. With the U.S. sample, 
the combination of omniscient authority, simple knowledge, and quick learning 
accounted for about 17.7% of the variance in P scores. With the Korean sample, the 
combination of omniscient authority and certain knowledge accounted for about 17% of 
the variance in P scores. Second, with both Korean and U.S. college students, Gilligan’s 
(1982) charge of gender-bias in Kohlberg’s model was not warranted by the evidence. 
Male and female students did not differ significantly in terms of their P scores. Also, 
education, major, and syllogistic reasoning had no significant correlations with P scores.
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With the Korean college students, age was significantly correlated with P score, but this 
correlation (r = .14) was very low.
Jeong’s (2003) study also revealed differences between the two cultural groups. 
The results revealed that Korean college students who viewed the nature of knowledge as 
certain scored lower on the DIT, whereas U.S. students’ beliefs about certain knowledge 
had no significant relationship with P scores and accounted for little variance in P scores. 
On the other hand, U.S. college students who endorsed simple knowledge produced 
lower principled moral reasoning scores, whereas Korean students’ beliefs about simple 
knowledge had no significant relationship with P score and accounted for little variance 
in P scores.
Summary
Based on Bendixen’s (1998) findings, Jeong’s (2003) study has suggested that 
both cultural similarities and differences between U.S. and Korean college students exist 
in the relationships between epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning. Initially,
Jeong’s (2003) study was based on his literature review conclusions that 1) 
Epistemological beliefs are related to reasoning even when other variables are removed 
from the equation (Bendixen et al., 1998; Bendixen et al., 1994), 2) Some beliefs are 
reasonable predictors of the unique variation in skilled reasoning scores; beliefs about 
simple knowledge, certain knowledge, and omniscient authority played especially 
important roles in P scores (Bendixen et al., 1998; Walker et al., 1991); beliefs in fixed 
ability, simple knowledge, and quick learning accurately discriminated between higher
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and lower reflective judgment (Bendixen et al., 1994); beliefs about certain knowledge 
played especially important roles in argumentative reasoning (Kuhn, 1991; King & 
Kitchener, 1994), and 3) There is a negative relationship between the acceptance of 
authority and P scores (Curtis et al., 1988; Presley, 1985; Rest et al., 1974).
Additional studies are needed among other cultural groups. As the author 
indicated earlier, the Chinese people, who comprise one-fifth of the world population, are 
thought to be unique for their traditions and their values, and it would be meaningful to 
explore a cross-cultural study of the relationships between epistemological beliefs and 
moral judgment of Americans and Chinese.
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Variables of Interest
Gender as Related to Moral Reasoning and to Epistemological Beliefs
Gilligan’s (1982) critique of Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning and her 
assertion of dichotomy in moral reasoning (sense of justice by men and sense of care by 
women) have been the subject of debate within the field of psychology for more than 15 
years. To date there is no evidence that there are two tracks of development, one for 
women and one for men. Those gender differences that do exist appear to be differences 
in mode or style rather than structure (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Furthermore, there is 
abundant evidence that girls’ and women’s responses to Kohlberg’s hypothetical 
dilemmas are readily scorable by the Standard Issue Scoring System and that, when 
education and occupation are controlled, there are no sex differences in stages (Gibbs, 
Arnold, & Burkhardt, 1984; Walker, 1984).
Jaffee and Hyde (2000) conducted a meta-analysis to review quantitatively the 
work on gender differences in moral orientation. The meta-analysis revealed small 
differences in the care orientation favoring females (d = -.28) and small differences in the 
justice orientation favoring males (d = .19). Together, the moderator variables accounted 
for 16% of the variance in the effect sizes for care reasoning and 17% of the variance in 
the effect sizes for justice reasoning. These findings do not offer strong support for the 
claim that the care orientation is used predominantly by women and that the justice 
orientation is used predominantly by men.
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A few researchers have investigated the relationship between personal 
epistemological beliefs and gender. In their original work, Belensky et al. (1986) 
explored ways of knowing among women, and subsequent research (Galotti et al., 1999) 
has supported gender differences in ways of knowing, with men more likely to endorse 
separate knowing and women more likely to endorse connected knowing. For the other 
variables explored in this study (epistemological beliefs), there has been little mention of 
gender as a variable in previous research. In Marrs’ (2005) study in which the influence 
of gender on each of these variables was explored, women scored higher than men on 
connected knowing, and men scored higher than women on separate knowing, a finding 
that is consistent with much of the previous research on ways of knowing (Galotti et al., 
1999; Knight et al., 2000; Knight, Elfenbein, & Martin, 1997). An important question 
that remained largely unexplored is how these differences develop, and what factors play 
a role in this development. Knight et al. (1997) have suggested that both educational 
experiences and family experiences may play a role in the development of connected and 
separate knowing. Future research that examines cultural factors, in addition to unique 
educational experiences (e.g. classroom structures) and family experiences (e.g. parenting 
styles), would be useful in gaining a better understanding of the development of ways of 
knowing.
Baxter Magolda (1990), for example, performed a three-year longitudinal study of 
college students using the measure of epistemological reflection (MER) and interviewing 
techniques. She found that during the freshman year, there were no significant gender 
differences in epistemological beliefs. In the sophomore and junior years, however, more 
men than women moved from position 2 to position 3 in the MER scheme (i.e., became
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more subjectivist). Baxter Magolda explains this by stating that, “Men viewed learning as 
a more active process than did women as indicated by men’s expectation of instructors, 
peers, and themselves, women’s expectations in these areas reflected a receiving mode of 
learning” (p. 559). Women, as a group, also were more concerned with the feelings of 
their peers than were men, wanting to create a relaxed atmosphere by talking to their 
peers and expressed a greater interest in working cooperatively with others and hearing 
their point of view. Men, by contrast, were more interested in debating with their peers 
and expressing their own opinions; rapport with the instructor was also more important to 
women than it was to men. The author, however, is quick to point out that “the patterns 
reported here were used more often by one gender but were not exclusive to one gender” 
(p. 560).
Schommer and Dunenll (1994), however, found the opposite to be true in their 
comparison of gifted and non-gifted high school students. Using the EQ, they found that 
boys were more likely to believe in fixed ability and quick learning than were girls, 
regardless of their level of giftedness.
Although Unger, Draper, & Pendergrass (1986) found no significant gender 
differences with regard to epistemological beliefs using the attitudes about reality scale 
(AAR) with college students, other researchers did. Walker, Rowland and Boyes (1991), 
in their study of the relationship between personality, personal epistemology, and moral 
judgment, found gender differences in the relationship between degree of objectivism as 
measured by the AAR and other variables. For women, objectivist epistemological 
beliefs were negatively correlated with sensation seeking, while for men, objectivist 
epistemological beliefs were negatively correlated with principled moral reasoning.
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Sensation seeking is defined as “the need for varied, novel, and complex sensation and 
experiences and the willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of such 
experiences” (Zuckerman, 1979, p. 10), A person who scores low on this scale is general 
thought to be rigid in attitude and cognition, and to be intolerant of ambiguity, which 
seems consistent with an objectivist epistemological belief system; it is not surprising 
then, that for women, the negative correlation between the AAR score and the sensation 
seeking scale reflects this relationship.
Moral reasoning is measured through the use of Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues 
Test (DIT), on which individuals rank a series of statements pertaining to several 
dilemmas. The statements are classified as either principled, based on ethical and 
humanitarian principles, or conventional, based on concrete rules. A “P” score, the ratio 
of principled to pre-principled items selected, is computed. It is thus expected that the “P” 
score would be negatively correlated with AAR scores. This was the case for the men in 
the sample, but not the women. The authors of the study explain this phenomenon by 
suggesting that women may respond differently to the AAR from men, perhaps because 
the AAR taps a personality domain as opposed to an attitudinal domain, which may 
explain the men’s responses.
Martin et al. (1994) measured epistemological beliefs using the Scale of Adult 
Intellectual Development (SAID), which identifies three distinct “epistemic strategies”: 
absolutism (more objectivist), evaluativism, and relativism (more subjectivist). Under this 
scheme, they found that men scored higher than women on both the Absolutism and 
Evaluativism strategies. No significant gender differences were found on the relativism 
measure.
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Ethnicity as Related to Moral Reasoning and to Epistemological Beliefs
The role of culture, to a point, has been examined in a limited fashion in studies of 
students’ epistemological beliefs. The only cultural perspectives examined have been 
upbringing or early home environment (Schommer, 1993a) and that of the classroom 
(Durkin, 1978-79), not ethnicity. This is unfortunate, because an individual’s ethnic 
background is something that should be considered, especially to determine if  students’ 
epistemological beliefs vary as a function of ethnicity.
Pai (1990) did conduct some research that included ethnic groups. In the study it 
was stated that one of the reasons individuals from different cultural or ethnic groups 
have trouble with the school system in America is their different perceptions of learning. 
Pai claimed that the American school system is based on the belief that learning takes 
place through personal involvement and active communication. However, difficulty 
occurs for some ethnic groups, because these groups believe that learning takes place 
through observation and emulation.
Examination of the relationship between ethnicity and students’ epistemological 
beliefs is confined to Pai’s (1990) suggestions. Studies that have been conducted have not 
included ethnicity as a background factor to consider when addressing beliefs about the 
nature of knowledge and learning. Based on Pai’s suggestions it is implied that the way in 
which individuals view learning and knowledge differ based on ethic groups. However, 
this has not been studied in enough detail to make a distinction between ethic groups nor 
to draw a substantial conclusion.
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Since Kohlberg, researchers have continued to ask questions concerning cultural 
influences on moral reasoning. Do cultural influences have an effect on moral reasoning 
and judgment? Different studies have been launched to verify the universality versus the 
uniqueness of moral development. Longitudinal studies (e.g., Page, 1981; Colby, 
Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Walker, 1989) and cross-cultural research (Snarey, 
1985; Rest, 1986; Edwards, 1987; Boyes & Walker, 1988; Gielen, 1990, 1991) support 
the validity and universality of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. Not 
surprisingly, however, some social scientists (Buck-Morss, 1975; Edwards, 1975, 1982; 
Bloom, 1977) dispute the hypothesis of the universality and permanence of the sequences 
of moral development. They consider that moral development would be culturally bound 
since different values are determined by the ideological and political principles of a 
culture, as well as the environment and other factors.
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III. METHODOLOGY
The methodology design is based on the three research questions for this study to 
explore whether gender and ethnicity have effects on college students’ moral reasoning 
and epistemological beliefs:
1) Are there differences in moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs between 
American and Chinese college students?
2) Does gender or ethnicity affect moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs 
between American and Chinese college students? and
3) Is there any interaction between gender and ethnicity in moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs?
Research Design
A survey was administered in this study in the spring semester of 2006 to 
investigate the influence of nationality and gender on college students’ moral reasoning 
and epistemological beliefs. A factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
was conducted to analyze the data collected from American and Chinese college students. 
The independent variables are 1) nationality with two levels—American college students 
and Chinese college students, 2) gender with two levels—male college students and 
female college students, and 3) ethnicity with two levels—majority group and minority 
group. The dependent variables are moral reasoning DIT scores—P scores and N2 index 
and the scores of the five epistemological beliefs— 1) simple knowledge (i.e., knowledge
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consists of discrete facts), 2) certain knowledge (i.e., absolute knowledge exists and will 
eventually be known), 3) omniscient authority (i.e., authorities have access to otherwise 
inaccessible knowledge), 4) quick learning (i.e., learning occurs in a quick or not-at-all 
fashion), and 5) innate ability (i.e., the ability to acquire knowledge is endowed at birth).
Participants
A total of 452 undergraduate college students from the United States and China 
participated in this study. The U.S. sample was composed of 149 college students who 
are enrolled in the education program of a university located in the eastern United States. 
The Chinese sample consists of 147 undergraduate students from a university in central 
China, a pre-service teacher training oriented institution, and of 156 undergraduate 
students from an ethnic university in northern China. Instructors were provided with a list 
of instructions for completing the questions and were asked to follow a standardized 
protocol for distributing and collecting the questionnaires to ensure confidentiality of 
responses. For both samples, participation was voluntary, and responses were anonymous.
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Instruments
The instruments that were administered to all the participants are a packet 
including the newer version of Defining Issues Test (DIT-2) (Rest et al., 1979, 1998, 
1999, 1999a, 1999b), a 32-item Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (Bendixen et al., 1998; 
Schraw et al., 2002), and a brief demographic information sheet. With the permission of 
the designers, all the instruments were translated into Chinese from English for the 
Chinese sample.
According to Behling and Law (2000) and Harkness (2003), three are approaches 
commonly used to translate surveys: simple direct translation, back-translation, and the 
committee approach. A simple direct translation is conducted by a single bilingual 
individual who translates the questionnaire from the source language into the target 
language. The advantages of this method are its affordability and short time requirements, 
while the flaws of this method are apparent-it depends too much on a lone translator’s 
skill and judgment. Back-translation is another technique with wide appeal, because it is 
relatively low cost and quick. Back-translation is an iterative process that entails these 
three basic steps: 1) translation of the source language instrument by a bilingual 
individual; 2) translation of the target language instrument back to the source language 
instrument by a second bilingual individual; 3) comparison of the original source 
instrument with the back translated source language instrument. The disadvantages, 
however, outweigh these benefits. Back-translation has several inherent flaws that 
preclude the production of data collection instruments with semantic, conceptual, and
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normative equivalence that are also reliable, complete, accurate and culturally 
appropriate.
The third approach is the committee approach. The committee includes several 
translators, at least one adjudicator, translation reviewers, subject matter specialists, and 
someone with knowledge and experience in questionnaire design and pretesting. The 
committee approach is more comprehensive and collaborative than the other approaches 
discussed above, because the approach calls for the pretesting of the translated instrument 
and relies on input from a team whose members have skill sets that go beyond the skills 
of a translator (Behling & Law, 2000; Harkness, 2003).
For this study, the third approach is used for the translation of the instruments but 
the procedure is simplified. First, two translators who know both English and Chinese 
very well are asked to independently translate the instruments from source language to 
the target language—namely, from English into Chinese, and then both their translations 
will be sent to translator reviewers in the United States and in China. Through emails, the 
translated versions of the instruments are discussed, and a reconciled version of the 
translated instruments are produced which then goes to the adjudicator who makes final 
decision, and the data collection instrument is then pre-tested. After the pre-testing is 
complete, the adjudicator and other committee members convene again to decide on the 
final decisions that result in the final data collection instrument ready for the field.
The Defining Issues Test (DIT-2). To measure students moral reasoning, the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT-2) (see Appendix A), the most popularly-used test for 
measuring this variable, developed by Rest et al. (1979, 1990, 1998, 1999, 1999a, 1999b; 
Trevino, 1992) is used for this study. The DIT (Rest, 1979) assesses how people justify or
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support their ethical decisions in terms of Kohlberg’s (1969) levels of moral reasoning. 
According to Kohlberg, there are three levels of moral development, pre-conventional, 
conventional, and post-conventional. Pre-conventional morality involves deciding on 
ethical issues based on avoiding punishment and seeking rewards; conventional morality 
entails living up to the expectations of relevant others and upholding the law, and post- 
conventional morality focuses on making ethical decisions in accordance with ethical 
principles.
The long form DIT consists of six separate dilemmas (Heinz and the Drug, 
Escaped Prisoner, Newspaper, Doctor’s Dilemma, Webster, Student Take-over). The 
short form DIT is identical to the full instrument, except that it contains three stories 
(Heinz and the Drug, Escaped Prisoner, and Doctor’s Dilemma). In the DIT, participants 
read a total of six stories that describe a moral dilemma. After a given story, the 
participants are offered two courses of action that a character in the story could take. The 
participants are asked to indicate, by a check mark, which of these actions should be 
taken (the participant is also offered a choice of “Can’t decide”). The choice of action is 
not used in determining the P score, because the purpose of the DIT is to determine the 
participants’ stage of moral reasoning in making an ethical decision, rather than to 
evaluate the decision itself.
Once the participants have indicated the action they believe the character in the 
story should take, they are asked to read twelve considerations that might be important to 
the character in deciding what action to take. The participants rate each of the twelve 
considerations as having “great, much, some, little, or no” importance to the character 
when deciding a course of action.
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Finally, the participants reread the twelve considerations, pick the four they 
believe are the most important, and rank those four as being the “most, second most, third 
most, and fourth most important” considerations. It is these rankings that are used to 
determine the P score. Rest (1979) explained how the P score is derived:
The item ranked as first importance in each story is given 4 points; the item 
ranked second, 3 points; the item ranked third, 2 points; and the item ranked 
fourth, 1 point. Since [sic] each dilemma has four ranks, each has 10 points to 
distribute among the stages. Points are totaled across the six stories for each stage. 
For instance, if a Stage 3 item was ranked in first place and another Stage 3 item 
was ranked in fourth place on the Heinz story, and if another Stage 3 item on the 
next story was ranked in second place, Stage 3 points would be 4 + 1 + 3. Total 
points would be calculated for each stage. There are 60 points in all, and the total 
number of points at each stage is divided by .60 to yield a percent score (for the 
convenience of having a base of 100 instead of 60). This procedure yields scores 
for Stage 2, 3, 4, 4 14, 5A, [5B], 6, and M. The P index is calculated by adding 
together the scores of Stage 5 A, 5B, and 6. The P index then represents the sum of 
weighted ranks given to “Principled” items, and is interpreted as the relative 
importance given to Principled moral considerations in making a moral decision
(p. 100-101).
The DIT provides an internal consistency check called an “M-score” that is 
designed to identify “faked” responses. It is based on subjects’ endorsing certain response 
items that sound “lofty” and “pretentious” but which have no meaning. According to Rest 
(1990), selecting these items represents a subject’s tendency to choose items for their
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pretentiousness rather than being an indication of any of Kohlberg’s stages of moral 
reasoning. Thus, the DIT’s scoring procedures call for invalidating the surveys of 
subjects with M-scores above a specified level.
A further internal validity test involves the consistency of a person’s choices. The 
instrument requires the subject to rank 12 questions or statements in their relative order of 
importance. The subject is not being consistent if an item ranked as “little importance” is 
rated as a subject’s first or second choice and selected ahead of items rated “very 
important.” If there are inconsistencies on more than two stories, or if  the number of 
inconsistencies on any one story exceeds eight, Rest (1990) recommends invalidation and 
exclusion of that person’s protocol.
An additional inconsistency check regards a subject’s lack of discrimination.
When a test protocol shows most items ranked the same, there is a suspicion that the 
subject is not taking the test seriously. If a story has more than 9 items rated the same, 
e.g., “some importance,” the authors recommend rejection of the entire protocol.
Rest et al. (1999) discussed validity and reliability of the DIT extensively and 
stated that both have been proven over hundreds of studies. In a mega-sample comprised 
of 45,856 DITs scored from 1989 through 1993, convincing evidence that validity and 
reliability are consistent across age, cultural background, and region is presented. In 
addition, the DIT significantly predicted to real-life moral behavior that is most important 
to this study (Rest et al., 1999). Cronbach alphas for the DIT are in the upper 0.70s and 
lower 0.80s and test/re-test reliability is commensurate (Rest & Narvaez, 1998).
The DIT2 (Rest et al., 1979, 1998, 1999, 1999a, 1999b) is a newer version of an 
objective test for moral reasoning based on Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental theory
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of moral development (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974; Rest, Narvaez, 
Thoma & Bebeau, 1999). On the DIT2, participants are presented with five separate 
dilemma scenarios (Famine, Reporter, School Board, Cancer, and Demonstration) that 
are similar to those originally used by Kohlberg (1976, 1981), and then asked to choose 
from a list of twelve items that represent prototypic statements of the stages of moral 
development. Participants are then asked to rate how important each question is in 
making a decision, what their decision is, and to rank the four most important questions. 
This process yields a DIT index score, called “N2”; a key feature of this index is that 
higher stage reasoning is prioritized and lower stage reasoning is rejected (Rest, Thoma, 
Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997). The test accounts not only for ranked items that reflect 
postconventional moral reasoning, but also for rated items that reflect respondents’ 
preferences for higher versus lower stage reasoning.
The DIT2 does not sacrifice validity, but rather equates or may actually improve 
validity through its updated construction (Rest & Narvaez, 1998). The DIT2 correlates 
positively with the original DIT (r = 0.79). With the new scoring indexes (N2) and new 
subject reliability checks, the DIT2 demonstrates the same validity as the original DIT. 
Therefore, the DIT2 is chosen for this study on account of its shorter version, clearer 
instructions, stronger subject reliability checks, updated language and dilemma stories, 
and strong validity.
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI). To measure students’ epistemological beliefs, a 
32-item Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (see Appendix B) is used (Bendixen et al., 1998). As 
previously discussed, Schraw et al. (2002) reported that the EBI had several advantages 
over an exploratory analysis of the Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) developed by
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Schommer (1990). First, Schommer’s EQ yielded a large number of potentially 
interpretable factors, each accounting for a relatively small share o f total sample variation. 
In comparison, the five factors identified by the EBI provided a close fit with the five 
epistemological dimensions hypothesized by Schommer (1990). The EBI did not have 
any obvious interpretative problems in that each of the factors was conceptually distinct 
and all of the items that loaded on individual factors were related logically to the relevant 
construct. Second, the first five factors on the EQ explained 35.5% of total variation, 
while the EBI explained 60% of total sample variation. A one-month replication led to 
values of 39% and 64% respectively. Third, the EBI had better predictive validity than 
the EQ. One explanation of these differences is that composite scores from the EBI were 
more variable and therefore more likely to increase the observed magnitude of r. Fourth, 
the EBI yielded a close replication of factors between the initial and replication analyses 
while the EQ did not, which indicated that the EBI is moral reliable over time than the 
EQ.
The Epistemological Beliefs Inventory was acquired from Schraw before the 
initial conceptualization of this study. Each of the 32 items is written as a grammatically 
simple statement to which individuals responded using a five-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). Individuals will make their 
ratings by circling the number that most closely reflects their agreement with the 
statement.
Very little psychometric data are available on the Epistemological Beliefs 
Inventory. However, the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory is closely related to a second 
instrument called the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (Schraw et al., 2002). The Epistemic
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Beliefs Inventory consists of 24 of the 32 items on the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory 
and four new items. It consists of five factors: 1) Omniscient Authority (coefficient a = 
.68), 2) Certain Knowledge (coefficient a = .62), 3) Quick Learning (coefficient a. =
.58), 4) Simple Knowledge (coefficient a  = .62), and 5) Innate Ability (coefficient a  = 
.62). Test-retest correlations after a one-month interval were r = .66, .81, .66, .64, and .62 
for each of the five factors (Schraw et al., 2002).
For this study, the 32-item Epistemological Beliefs Inventory was checked for its 
reliability with the result in the Chinese group of a = .42 for Simply Knowledge, a. -  .66 
for Certain Knowledge, a = .42 for Quick Learning, a  = .45 for Omniscient Authority, 
and a = .52 for Innate Ability. But the results were found higher with the American group 
with a -  .49 for Simply Knowledge, a -  .63 for Certain Knowledge, a  = .52 for Quick 
Learning, a  = .54 for Omniscient Authority, and a -  .65 for Innate Ability.
Demographic Questionnaire. Demographic questions (Appendix C) include: (a) 
age, (b) gender, (c) academic major, (d) current GPA, (e) ethnic background, and (f) 
educational level.
Data Collection Procedures
The following procedures were followed. An Informed Consent letter was 
attached with the survey to the participants in the United States outlining the goal of the 
research project, indicating approval and support from the University Human Subjects 
Committee of ODU (see Appendix D), and asking the student to participate (Appendix 
E). At the time the consent letter was signed by each participant, the researcher gathers
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data for the independent variables, that is, age, gender, academic major, current GPA, 
ethnic background and educational level from the survey and then assign the student a 
code number. This unique code was written on the scoring sheet of each of the 
questionnaires to match the test scores with the variable data. Once a code was assigned, 
there was no further use of the participant’s name. Further, any identifying information 
was shredded at the conclusion of the study. When students arrived for their information 
session, students were asked if they participate in the study. If willing, the students were 
asked to sign the consent form and then to complete the survey.
With the permission of Luoyang Normal University in China (see Appendix F) 
and the permission of Central University for Nationalities (see Appendix G), the research 
assistants were provided instructions for administering the instruments to Chinese 
students sampled by following the similar procedure as U.S. Sample Group does. Other 
information was restricted as much as possible to reduce the likelihood of any 
experimental bias.
Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with each 
statement on the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI), using the 5-point scale. Mean 
completion time was approximately five minutes. After completing the brief 
demographic questionnaire, participants were given the newer version of the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT-2), for which the mean completion time was about 30-35 minutes.
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Method of Data Analysis
A factorial multivariate analysis of variance of (MANOVA) was conducted with 
gender, ethnicity and nationality as independent variables and moral reasoning and the 
five epistemological beliefs as dependent variables to examine the influence of gender, 
ethnicity and nationality on moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs. When 
significant difference was found on omnibus MANOVA, analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
on each dependent variable was performed as follow-up tests to the MANOVA, using 
one of the Bonferroni approaches to control for Type I error across these multiple tests. 
When significant difference was found, pair-wise comparisons were conducted as post 
hoc to determine the effect of each of the independent variables on each dependent 
measure. In addition, interaction between the three independent variables—ethnicity, 
gender and nationality were examined.
To be specific, in conducting MANOVA by SPSS, the first step in interpreting the 
MANOVA results was to assess the Box’s Test. If the homogeneity of variance- 
covariance was assumed, the Wilks’s Lambda is utilized to interpret the multivariate 
tests. If the assumption of equal variance was violated, Pillai’s Trace was referred to. 
After the multivariate test statistic had been identified, the significance (F ratios and p 
values) of factor interaction was examined, followed by the evaluation of the F ratios and 
p values for each factor’s main effect. If multivariate significance was found, the 
univariate ANOVA results were interpreted to determine significant group differences for 
each dependent variable. If univariate significance was revealed, the post hoc results were 
examined to identify which groups are significantly different for each dependent variable.
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IV. RESULT
The purpose of this study was to explore the cultural differences in 
epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning between American and Chinese college 
students. Therefore, the results were organized into three sections. In the first section, a 
series of factorial multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were conducted to 
determine the overall effect of gender and ethnicity in both countries and then in each 
country on the seven dependent variables, the five EBI scores and two DIT scores. The 
second section addresses the factor structure of the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory. 
The third section examines the influence of gender and ethnicity on each of the dependent 
variables in American culture and Chinese culture respectively and as a whole.
Descriptive Statistics
A total of 452 undergraduate college students from the United States and China 
participated in this study. The U.S. sample was composed of 149 college students who 
are enrolled in the education program of a university located in the eastern United States. 
The Chinese sample consists of 147 undergraduate students from a university in central 
China, a pre-service teacher training oriented institution, and 156 undergraduate students 
from an ethnic university in northern China. Instructors were provided with a list of 
instructions for completing the questions and were asked to follow a standardized 
protocol for distributing and collecting the questionnaires in order to ensure 
confidentiality of responses. For both samples, participation was voluntary and responses
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were anonymous.
Table 5. Demographic Description of Participants
American Chinese
(n = 149) (n = 303)
Frequency (percent) Frequency (percent)
Gender
Male 24(16.1) 83 (27.4)
•Female 125 (83.9) 220 (72.6)
Ethnic Group
Majority 117(78.5) 235 (77.6)
Minority 32(21.5) 68 (22.4)
Major
Science 47 (31.5) 106 (35.0)
Social science 102 (68.5) 197 (65.0)
Age Mean (Range) Mean (Range)
24.7 (18-51) 20.9 (18-24)
GPA Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
3.14 (.607) 3.23 (.476)
In the U.S. sample, ten sets of responses were eliminated—two for failure to pass 
the internal check for consistency of responses on the Defining Issues Test. Of the 
remaining 149 participants, 125 (83.9%) were female and 24 (16.1%) male; 117 (78.5%) 
were White and 32 (21.5%) were minority students; 102 (68.5) were in social science 
majors and 47 (31.5) in science majors; participants’ ages ranged from 18-51, averaging 
24.7 years. The average GPA was 3.14.
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In the Chinese sample, ten sets of responses were eliminated—nine for failure to 
pass the internal check for consistency of responses on the Defining Issues Test. Of the 
remaining 303 participants, 220 (72.6%) were female and 83 (27.4%) male; 235 (77.6%) 
were Han and 68 (22.4%) were minority students; 197 (65.0) were in social science 
majors and 106(35.0) in science majors; participants’ ages ranged from 18-24, averaging 
20.9 years. The average GPA was 3.23.
Prior to the MANOVA analysis, simple independent t-tests were used to estimate 
the differences between Chinese and U.S. college students in all variables. The results 
indicated that Chinese college students tended to believe, more strongly than U.S. college 
students, that knowledge is simple, t (450) = -5.54, p  = .001, ability to learn is innate, t 
(450) = - 4.02, p  < .001, and learning process happens quickly, t (450) = -10.11 ,p  <. 001. 
U.S. students believed more strongly than their counterparts that authorities have access 
to otherwise inaccessible knowledge, t (450) = 19.62, p  < .001, and that knowledge is 
certain, t (450) = 5.62,p  <. 001. The analyses indicated that the Chinese college students 
obtained significantly higher P scores (M = 40.68, SD = 14.29) and N2 scores (M = 40.15, 
SD = 14.03 in comparison to the U. S. students’ P scores (M = 31.41, SD =14.23) and N2 
scores (M = 31.92, SD = 19.26). Table 6 summarizes the means and standard deviations 
for all variables and results of the t-tests.
As recommended by Cohen (1988), effect sizes with respect to each of the 
independent variables were computed. Cohen’s criteria for evaluating the effect sizes 
suggest that the effect size pertaining to omniscient authority and quick learning was 
quite large, and that simple knowledge and certain knowledge indicated a medium effect 
size. Also, the effect sizes pertaining to P scores and N2 scores approached moderate
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Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations for American and Chinese College Students
American (n = 149) Chinese (n = 303)
Variables M SD M SD t d
Epistemological Variables
Simple Knowledge 2.79 0.47 3.04 0.39 -5.54 -.59
Certain Knowledge 2.36 0.65 2.00 0.60 5.62 .58
Innate Ability 2.71 0.58 2.93 0.54 -4.02 -.39
Omniscient Authority 3.41 0.63 2.22 0.59 19.62 1.95
Quick Learning 1.94 0.51 2.47 0.52 -10.11 -1.03
P Scores 31.41 14.23 40.68 14.29 -6.50 -.65
N2 Scores 31.92 19.26 40.15 14.03 -4.65 -.49
* p  <.001, two-tailed.
The Factor Structure of the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory
The five epistemological dimensions hypothesized by Schommer (1990) and Schraw, 
Bendixen, and Dunkle’s (2002) findings were labeled Innate Ability, Quick Learning, 
Omniscient Authority, Simple Knowledge, and Certain Knowledge (see Table 7). Each 
factor included at least three items with loadings in excess of .30.
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Table 7. Factor Structure of the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory
Factor 1: Omniscient Authority (Eigenvalue = 1.63; a  = .68)
People should not question authority. (.73)
Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority. (.66)
When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it. (.62)
Factor 2: Certain Knowledge (Eigenvalue -  1.63; a  = .62)
The moral rules I live by apply to everyone. (.72)
What is true today will be true tomorrow. (.63).
Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life. (.50)
Factor 3: Quick Learning (Eigenvalue = 1.47; a  = .58)
Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time. (.71)
If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back over it won’t 
help. (.53)
If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever leam it. (.49).
Factor 4: Simple Knowledge (Eigenvalue = 1.43; a  = .62)
Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories. (.78)
Too many theories just complicate things. (.57)
Most things worth knowing are easy to understand. (.44)
Factor 5: Innate Ability (Eigenvalue = 1.36; a  = .62)
How well you do in school depends on how smart you are. (.76)
Smart people are bom that way. (.56)
Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in school. (.30)
From Schraw et al., “Development and validation o f the epistemic belief inventory (EBI)” (pp. 261-275). In 
B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistemology, 2002, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Preliminary analyses of coefficient alpha of the subscale scores of the instruments 
used in this study indicated possible problems with the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory.
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Coefficient alphas for the five subscales were much lower than expected (Bendixen et al., 
1998; Schraw et al., 2002). Using the original subscales specified by the instruments 
authors, the 32-item Epistemological Beliefs Inventory was checked for its reliability 
with the result in the Chinese group of a  = .42 for Simply Knowledge, a  = .66 for Certain 
Knowledge, a =  .42 for Quick Learning, a=  .45 for Omniscient Authority, and a=  .52 
for Innate Ability. But the results were found higher with the American group with a  
= .49 for Simply Knowledge, a  = .63 for Certain Knowledge, a = .52 for Quick Learning, 
a = .54 for Omniscient Authority, and a. = .65 for Innate Ability.
Subsequent confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses also indicated problems 
with the instruments. Because of the difficulties, the subscales of the Epistemological 
Beliefs Inventory were computed using items specified by Bendixen et al. (1998). This 
resulted in subscales with fewer items. Using the shortened subscales resulted in 
improved alphas for Certain Knowledge and Simple Knowledge, and decreased alphas 
for Omniscient Authority, Quick Learning, and Fixed Ability. All subsequent analyses 
were conducted using the shortened subscales.
In order to examine the underlying factor structure of the Epistemic Beliefs 
Inventory (EBI), a Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted using LISREL 8.7 
(Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996). Missing values in the data set were replaced with the means 
of the variable for the sample. A five-factor model proposed by Bendixen et al. (1998) 
was tested for goodness of fit. The five-factor model of epistemological beliefs consisted 
of the latent variables Omniscient Authority, Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge, 
Quick Learning, and Fixed Ability. The five-factor model did not fit the data well (N  = 
440), with a Goodness of Fit index of .74 and an Adjusted Goodness of Fit index of .70.
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The Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR) was 5.84. For this sample, it appears that the 
EBI failed to measure the five components of epistemic beliefs identified in previous 
research using the instrument.
Because of the poor fit of sample data to the measurement model of the EBI, a 
principal components analysis was conducted (Stevens, 2002). The number of factors 
was determined by examination of the scree plot. A total of three factors emerged in the 
principal components analysis. After varimax rotation, Factor 1 accounted for 12.6 % of 
the variance, Factor 2 accounted for 9.7 % of the variance, and Factor 3 accounted for 6.4 
%. Although three factors emerged, no clear conceptual structure was identified. Other 
methods of exploratory factor analyses were attempted (principal axis factoring, oblimin 
rotations); however, the problems with factor structure remained and the instrument 
appeared to lack a clear factor structure. In light of these difficulties, items Bendixen et al. 
(1998) recommended were used to form shortened subscales of the five epistemological 
beliefs factors.
Data Analysis
The methodology design, a factorial multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), was based on the three following research questions for this dissertation to 
explore whether ethnicity and gender have effects on college students’ moral reasoning 
and epistemological beliefs:
1. Are there differences in moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs between
American and Chinese college students?
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2. Does gender or ethnicity affect moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs 
between American and Chinese college students?
3. Is there any interaction between ethnicity and gender in moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs?
The following specific questions address the MANOVA analysis, univariate ANOVA
analysis, and post hoc analysis:
• Are there significant mean differences in the combined dependent variable of 
moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs for males and females?
• Are there significant mean differences in the combined dependent variable of 
moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs for the students in different ethnic 
groups?
• Are there significant mean differences in the combined dependent variable of 
moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs for different groups—American and 
Chinese college students?
• Is there a significant interaction between gender, ethnicity and country on the 
combined dependent variable of moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs?
• Are there significant mean differences on moral reasoning between males and 
females?
• Are there significant mean differences on moral reasoning between students from 
different ethnic groups?
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• Are there significant mean differences on moral reasoning between students from 
the United States and China?
• Is there a significant interaction between gender, ethnicity and country on moral 
reasoning?
• Are there significant mean differences on epistemological beliefs between males 
and females?
• Are there significant mean differences on epistemological beliefs between 
students from different ethnic groups?
• Are there significant mean differences on epistemological beliefs between 
students from the United States and China?
• Is there a significant interaction between gender, ethnicity and country on 
epistemological beliefs?
• Is there a relationship between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs? Are 
there differences m the relationship between moral reasoning and epistemological 
beliefs between American College students and Chinese counterparts?
A three-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on 
these seven dependent variables: Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge, Innate Ability, 
Omniscient Authority and Quick Learning for the source of epistemological beliefs, and 
P score and N2 index for moral reasoning. The independent variables were student
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ethnicity (majority and minority), student gender (male and female) and student group 
(American and Chinese).
Twelve extreme scores or univariate outliers were observed for moral reasoning 
measure and were eliminated from the analysis, leaving a total of N = 440 college 
students. Student group was distributed as American college students (33.2%) and 
Chinese college students (66.8%) (See Figure 1). Student gender was distributed with 
23.6% male students and 76.4% female students (See Figure 2). Student ethnicity was 
distributed as majority group, White Americans in the U.S. sample and Han ( MM)  
Chinese in the Chinese sample (78.4%) and minority group (21.6%) from both countries 
(See Figure 3). The minority in the ethnicity variable was transformed from African 
American (n = 18), Asian American (n = 5), Hispanic or Latino American (n = 6) and 
Other (n = 3) from the American group, and Hui Chinese ( \b\M  ) (n = 21), Tujia 
Chinese ( M M M )  (n = 10), Manchu Chinese ($ptl^) (n=  10), Zhuang Chinese ( >ht 
M)  (n = 8), Yao Chinese ( MM)  (n = 4), Korean Chinese ( ~MMM ) (n = 3), Miao 
Chinese ( H M  ) (n = 3), Dong Chinese ( f|sj ) (n = 2), She Chinese ( iaM)  (n = 2),
Jin Chinese (n = 2), Mongolian Chinese ( M M M )  (n =1), Tahur Chinese ( i i
^ M M )  (n = 1) and Japanese Chinese ( M M )  (n = 1) from the Chinese group.
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A statistically significant Box’s M test (p < .0001) indicated unequal variance- 
covariance matrices of the dependent variables across levels of student ethnicity, student 
gender and student group, and thus necessitated the use of Phillai’s trace in assessing the 
multivariate effects.
Table 8. Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices and Equality of Error Variances
Overall S K CK IA OA QL P N2




1.99 .07 1.70 .11 .88 .52 1.25 .27 .77 .61 1.30 .25 3.91 .000
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Table 9. Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances
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F dfl dfl P
Simple Knowledge 1.899 1 432 .068
Certain Knowledge 1.703 7 432 .106
Innate Ability .879 7 432 .523
Omniscient Authority 1.253 7 432 .272
Quick Learning .770 7 432 .613
P Score 1.293 7 432 .252
N2 Score 3.915 7 432 .000
• Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.
• Design: Intercept+ sex + ethnic + group + sex x ethnic + sex x group + ethnic x group + sex x ethnic x group
Using Phillai’s trace (see Table 10), the dependent variate was significantly 
affected by the main effects of student group, Phillai’s trace = .22, F  (7, 426) -  16.73,/? = 
<. 001. The multivariate r\2 based on Phillai’s trace was strong, .22, indicating that 22% 
of multivariate variance of the dependent variables was associated with the group factor.
Neither the multivariate interaction effects of Ethnicity x Gender, Gender x 
Group, Ethnicity x Group, Gender x Ethnicity x Group, nor the multivariate main effects 
of gender and ethnicity were statistically significant.
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Table 10. Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Epistemological Beliefs and Moral 
Reasoning
Effect Value F P Partial tj
Gender .022 1.396(a) .205 .022




Gender x Ethnicity .019 1.168(a) .320 .019
Gender x Group .025 1.545(a) .150 .025
Ethnicity x Group .015 .925(a) .487 .015
Gender x Ethnicity x Group .020 1.256(a) .271 .020
•  Multivariate f-ratios were generated from Phillai’s trace.
• Design: Intercept + sex + ethnic + group + sex x ethnic + sex x group + ethnic x group + sex x
ethnic x group.
•  Multivariate d f= l,  426.
• P < .0001
In order to confirm the above results that the multivariate interaction effect of 
Ethnicity x Gender and their main effects were not significant, the data was split into two 
groups—the American college students and the Chinese college students, where the 
group was not considered as a factor. A second two-way multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted to determine the effect of gender and ethnicity in both the 
American and Chinese groups—on the seven dependent variables, the five EBI scores 
and two DIT scores. A non-significant Box’s M test (p  = .019) in the American group
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indicated equal variance-covariance matrices of the dependent variables across levels of 
student ethnicity, student gender and student group, and thus Wilks’ Lambda (A) was 
used to assess the multivariate effects. A statistically significant Box’s M test ( p  < .0001) 
in the Chinese group indicated unequal variance-covariance matrices of the dependent 
variables across levels of student ethnicity, student gender and student group, and thus 
necessitated the use of Phillai’s trace in assessing the multivariate effects.
No significances were found among gender and ethnicity on the dependent 
measures in either group. In the American group, Wilks’ A = .95, F  (7, 136) = 1.09, p 
= .38. The multivariate r\2 based on Wilks’A was not strong, .05 (see Table 11). In the 
Chinese group, Phillar’s trace = .01, F  (7, 284) = .26, p  = .95. The multivariate q 2 based 
on Wilks’A was not strong, .01 (see Table 12). The multivariate main effects of gender, 
ethnicity and the interaction between gender, ethnicity were confirmed not significant.
Table 11. Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Epistemological Beliefs and Moral 
Reasoning in American Group
Effect Value F P Partial r f
Gender .947 1.083(a) .378 .053
Ethnicity .963 .737(a) .641 .037
Gender x Ethnicity .947 1.090(a) .373 .053
• Multivariate f-ratios were generated from Wilk’s Lambda.
• a Exact statistic
• b Design: Intercept+sex+ethnic+group+sex * ethnic+sex * group+ethnic * group+sex * ethnic * group
• Multivariate df=l,  136.
• P < .0001
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Table 12. Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Epistemological Beliefs and Moral 
Reasoning in Chinese Group
Effect Value F P Partial r f
Gender .029 1.204(a) .300 .029
Ethnicity .034 1.440a) .189 .034
Gender x Ethnicity .006 .263(a) .968 .006
•  Multivariate f-ratios were generated from Pillai’s Trace.
• a Exact statistic
• b Design: Intercept+sex+ethnic+group+sex * ethnic+sex * group+ethnic * group+sex * ethnic * group
•  Multivariate df=7, 284.
• P < .0001
A third one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
determine the main effect of the group on the seven dependent variables, the five EBI 
scores and two DIT scores. Significances were found among the country as a group on 
the dependent measures, Wilks’ A = .39, F  (7, 432) = 98.5\ ,p  = < .001. The multivariate 
r f  based on Wilks’A was very strong, .62 indicating that 62% of multivariate variance of 
the dependent variables was associated with the group factor.
Univariate ANOVAs were conducted on each dependent variable as follow-up 
tests to the first MANOVA to determine the locus of the statistically significant 
multivariate main effect of student group. Using the Bonferroni method, each ANOVA 
was tested at the .007 level. The ANOVA on the Simple Knowledge scores was
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significant, F  (1, 444) =939, p  < .007, r\ = .02. The ANOVA on the Certain Knowledge 
scores was significant, F  (1, 444) =10.70,/? < .007, r\2 = .02. The ANOVA on the 
Omniscient Authority scores was significant, F  (1, 444) = 49.32, p < .001, r|2 = .10. The 
ANOVA on the Quick Learning scores was significant, F  (1, 444) = 25.32, p < .001, r|2 
= .05. (See Table 13)
Post hoc analysis was not performed, in that all the independent variables had two 
levels. The American college students tended to believe more than their Chinese 
counterparts that knowledge comes from the source of omniscient authority and 
knowledge is certain. The Chinese college students tended to believe more than their 
American counterparts that knowledge consists of discrete facts (simple knowledge), and 
that learning occurs in a quick or not-at-all fashion (quick learning).
Table 13. Univariate Analysis of Variance for Epistemological Beliefs and Moral 
Reasoning
Source Dependent Variable F P Partial r)2 MS MSE
Group Simple Knowledge 9.808 .002 .022 1.698 .173
Certain Knowledge 10.645 .001 .024 4.137 .389
Innate Ability 5.894 .016 .013 1.806 .306
Omniscient Authority 50.238 .000 .104 18.085 .360
Quick Learning 26.140 .000 .057 6.886 .263
P Score 2.916 .088 .007 525.736 180.293
N2 Score 4.050 .045 .009 800.419 197.623
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Table 14. Means Scores and Standard Deviations for Measures of the Epistemological
Beliefs as a Function of Group
American Chinese
Epistemological Beliefs M SD M SD
Simple Knowledge 2.79 0.47 3.04 0.39
Certain Knowledge 2.36 0.65 2.00 0.60
Omniscient Authority 3.41 0.63 2.22 0.59
Quick Learning 1.94 0.51 2.50 0.52
3 -
M 2
I American College 
Students
! Chinese College 
Students
1 = Simple Knowledge, 2 = Certain Knowledge, 3 = Omniscient Authority, 4 = Quick Learning
Figure 4. Mean Differences of Epistemological Beliefs
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Figure 5. Mean Differences of Simple Knowledge
These findings indicated that American college students tend to believe less than 
their Chinese counterparts that knowledge consists of discrete facts.







A m erican C h in e se
group
Figure 6. Mean Differences of Certain Knowledge
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The “certainty of knowledge” portion of these findings is consistent with cultural 
differences in “uncertainty avoidance” proposed by Hofstede (1980), who found that both 
the United States and China are low in uncertainty avoidance. To this point, China is 
much lower than the United States. Particularly in learning situations, students from high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures are often comfortable with well-structured instruction that 
has clear goals and elaborated, step-by-all the answers (Hofstede, 1986).
3 . 5 0 -
:§ *  3 . 2 5 -
C  3 . 0 0 “
O 2 . 7 5 -
2 . 5 0 -
A m e ric an C h in e s e
group
Figure 7. Mean Differences of Omniscient Authority
The source of knowledge findings are contradictory with Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) 
findings that the United States is in a low power distance culture where authority is less 
respected, and knowledge is developed from individuals’ own reasoning and experiences, 
while China is high in power distance culture where authority is highly respected and 
knowledge handed down by an authority who has access to otherwise inaccessible 
knowledge (Schommer, 1993; Schommer et al., 1992; Schommer et al., 1997).
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Figure 8. Mean Differences of Quick Learning
The Speed of Learning factor represents students’ beliefs about the speed of 
knowledge acquisition. Chinese college students tend to believe more than their U.S. 
counterpart that learning should occur quickly or not at all rather than gradually over time.
Correlation Analysis for Epistemological Beliefs and Moral Reasoning
The American Group
Of the five epistemological beliefs variables, three were significantly related to P 
scores (See Table 15). Those variables, statistically significant and indicative of an 
inverse relationship, were simple knowledge (r -  -.20, p  < .01), omniscient authority (r 
= -.30, p  < .01), and quick learning (r = -.20, p  < .01), in which quick learning (r = -.20,
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p  < .01) was confirmed to be related with N2 score. Scores high on those dimensions 
were correlated negatively with P scores or N2 scores, indicating that higher level of 
principled moral reasoning were associated with a more sophisticated and presumably 
less conventional, epistemological belief system.
These findings were consistent with those of previous studies, the results of which 
had shown a negative relationship between the acceptance of authority and P scores 
(Bendixen et al., 1998; Curtis et al., 1988; Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Presley, 1985); 
the findings also were consistent with those of Walker et al. (1991), who reported that the 
DIT scores increased as epistemological beliefs measured on a unidimensional scale 
became more sophisticated.



















Ability .148 .103 -
Omniscient
Authority .301** .238** .217**
-
Quick
Learning .297** .252** .352** .082 —
P Score -.196* -.148 -.077 -.301** -.195* —
N2 Score -.133 -.043 -.088 -.158 -.204* .706** -
Gender .090 -.040 -.070 .2 2 1 ** .027 -.034 .032 —
Ethnic
Group .072 .015 -.017 .057 . 0 2 2 .076 .215** .185* -
* p  <.05, two-tailed. ** p  <.01, two-tailed.
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The Chinese Group
Correlations among all variables in the Chinese sample were not significant (see Table 
16). King and Kitchener (1994) also claimed that the development of epistemological 
cognition (in this case, reflective judgment) may be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for moral judgment.

















Knowledge - . 1 1 0 -
Innate
Ability .053 .048 -
Omniscient
Authority -.040
5 7 4 ** .229** -
Quick
Learning .062 .339** .436** .345** —
P Score - . 0 2 1 -.053 .077 -.060 .061 -
N2 Score -.054 -.081 .083 -.035 .041 .903** —
Gender -.008 -.086 -.015 -.069 -.129* .099 .116* —
Ethnic
Group -.009 -.057 .128* . 0 2 1 .043 .069 .103 -.048 -
* p  <.05, two-tailed. ** p  <.01, two-tailed.
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Summary
A series of factorial multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were 
conducted to determine the overall effect of gender and ethnicity in both countries and 
then in each country on the seven dependent variables, the five EBI scores and two DIT 
scores. The results indicated that there were no interactions between gender and ethnicity 
and no main effects of gender and ethnicity on moral reasoning and epistemological 
beliefs. There were no significant differences in moral reasoning and epistemological 
beliefs between male and female college students. Gilligan’s (1982) charge of gender- 
bias in Kohlberg’s model was not warranted by the present evidence. The role of gender 
in Baxter Magolda’s (1992, 2001) epistemological reflection model was not supported by 
the findings from this study. In Baxter Magoda’s model, she claimed that males adopted 
more “impersonal” and “individualist” ways of knowing, and women more “personal” 
and “interindividualist” ways of knowing. There were no significant differences in moral 
reasoning and epistemological beliefs between ethnical majority group students and 
ethnical minority students. No significant difference in moral reasoning was found 
between American college students and Chinese college students. These findings may 
provide evidence in support of Kohlberg’s model of cognitive and moral development in 
the debate between cultural psychologists and Kohlbergians.
The significant differences found between American college students and Chinese 
college students were in the following epistemological beliefs: simple knowledge, certain
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knowledge, omniscient authority and quick learning. This might result from other factors 
rather than gender and ethnicity.
In addition, the relationship found between moral reasoning and epistemological 
beliefs in the American group was consistent with the findings of the previous studies 
(Perry, 1970; Kohlberg, 1971a, 1971b; Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle, 1998; King & 
Kitchener, 1994, 2002; Jeong, 2003) and no significant correlation found between moral 
reasoning and epistemological beliefs in the Chinese group has provided an interesting 
topic for discussion.
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V. DISCUSSION 
Differences in Epistemological Beliefs and Moral Reasoning Between American 
College Students and Chinese College Students
By investigating the influence of the independent variables gender, ethnicity and 
nationality on dependent variables of DIT scores for moral reasoning and EBI scores for 
epistemological beliefs from both American and Chinese college students, the purpose of 
this study was to explore the cultural differences in epistemological beliefs and moral 
reasoning between American and Chinese college students. The MANOVA results 
indicated that there were no interactions between gender and ethnicity and no main 
effects of gender and ethnicity on moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs. The 
significant differences found between American college students and Chinese college 
students were in the epistemological beliefs: simple knowledge, certain knowledge, 
omniscient authority and quick learning, that is, American college students had higher 
mean scores than their Chinese counterparts in certain knowledge and omniscient 
authority, and had lower mean scores than Chinese college students in simple knowledge 
and quick learning. This might result from other factors rather than gender and ethnicity.
In addition, a correlation, though weak, between moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs was found in the American group. No significant correlation was 
found between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs in the Chinese group.
As discussed in the literature review, Schommer (1990) initiated a line of research 
focusing more on how students’ epistemological beliefs are related to their academic
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cognition and performance. She described personal epistemology as a system of more or 
less independent beliefs, conceptualized as beliefs about the simplicity, certainty, and 
source of knowledge, as well as beliefs about the control and speed of knowledge 
acquisition. The first three dimensions fall under the more generally accepted definition 
of personal epistemology as beliefs about the nature of knowledge (simplicity, certainty) 
and knowing (source) (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Pintrich, 2002), although the two last 
dimensions in Schommer’s (1990) conceptualization have been more controversial (see 
Table 17). Both these last dimensions may be derived from Dweck’s (1999; Dweck, Chiu, 
& Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) research on students’ implicit theories of 
intelligence. In that research, some students have been found to favor an incremental 
theory and conceive of intelligence as a malleable, increasable, and controllable quality, 
while other students seem to construct an entity theory and believe that intelligence is a 
fixed and uncontrollable trait. In addition, students who believe that intelligence is fixed 
and uncontrollable seem more likely to believe that learning occurs quickly or not at all, 
in accordance with their intellectual gift.
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Table 5. Five Dimensions of Epistemological Beliefs (Schommer, 1990)
Epistemological beliefs Low end of continuum High end of continuum
Certainty of knowledge Knowledge is unchanging. Knowledge is evolving.
Omniscient authority Knowledge is handed down 
by authority.
Knowledge is acquired 
through reason and 
evidence.
Simple knowledge Knowledge is organized as 
isolated bits and pieces.
Knowledge is organized as 
highly interrelated concepts.
Innate ability The ability to learn is 
inherited and unchangeable.
The ability to learn can 
improve over time.
Quick learning Learning is a quick process. Learning is a gradual 
process.
In her study in 1994, Schommer changed some o f the factor labels. The new labels include: 1) certainty of 
knowledge, 2) source o f knowledge, 3) organization o f knowledge, 4) control o f learning, and 5) speed of 
learning.
The findings of my study indicated that Chinese students tended to believe more 
simple knowledge and quick learning than their American counterparts. This finding 
seemed to support the perception of Chinese students as surface learners rather than deep 
learners, due to rote memorization.
In the process of acquiring knowledge, two common approaches are “surface” and 
“deep” processing (Beatie, Collins, & Mclnnes, 1997; Chan, 2003a). Students using 
“surface” approach focus on the substance of knowledge and emphasize rote learning and 
memorization techniques (Biggs, 1989; Tagg, 2003). An intention to reproduce the 
material to be learned and avoid failure through regurgitating information and using rote 
learning techniques characterizes the ‘surface’ approach. In contrast, a ‘deep’ approach is
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indicated by an intention to understand the material to be learned, using strategies such as 
reading widely, combining a variety of resources, discussion, reflection, relating parts to 
a whole, and applying knowledge in real world situations (Biggs, 1987, 1989, 1997; 
Entwistle, 1981; Ramsden, 2003; Tagg, 2003).
With relation to Chinese students, much of this work has centered on what has 
been referred to as “the paradox of the Chinese learner” (Marton et al. 1993, pp.15-16; 
Watkins & Biggs, 1996). This notion is based on the following premises: most Chinese 
students see knowledge acquisition as a simple and quick process and are categorized as 
rote learners, and rote learning is known to lead to poor learning outcomes; therefore, 
Chinese students should exhibit poor academic performance. In contrast, the evidence is 
that Confucian heritage students from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Mainland 
China tend to outperform Western students in international comparisons of educational 
progress and as international students at Western universities (Stevenson & Lee, 1996; 
Chan, 2003a).
Students bring into the learning system some epistemological beliefs that are 
learning-related, such as prior knowledge, abilities, values and expectations, ways of 
learning. These learning-related characteristics are referred to as the student presage 
factors that have a direct impact on the ways students choose to process academic tasks.
However, learning process is contextual in which the environment is set by the 
instructor and the institution through the course structure, curriculum content, methods of 
teaching and assessment. Students perceive and interpret this knowledge acquisition 
context and adopt a study approach that they think will help them to meet the demands of 
the instructors and the courses. As discussed earlier, epistemological beliefs are
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multidimensional, and these will be reflected in individuals’ approaches when acquiring 
knowledge. For example, the same student may take a deep approach in a humanities 
class, where it seems to be demanded, and a surface approach in a science class where 
just grabbing the facts and formulae seem to equal academic success. Biggs (1997; p .137) 
even argues that “memorizing is not surface learning”, and “memorizing through 
repetition is an essential, a deep strategy in many tasks” (Biggs, 1997, p.7). Biggs (1996) 
describes the Chinese as “docile” students, who are “teachable”. Chinese students enter 
the classroom with the beliefs that their teachers are their friends and moral guides who 
have valuable knowledge and that it is their duty as students to learn (Chan, 2003a). Thus 
solved “the paradox of the Chinese learner” (Marton et al. 1993, pp.15-16; Watkins & 
Biggs, 1996).
Another finding in this study is that American college students had higher mean 
scores than their Chinese counterparts in certain knowledge and omniscient authority, 
which is somewhat beyond the researchers’ expectation. According to Perry (1970), in 
higher level of epistemological beliefs, “knowledge is seen as increasingly conjectural 
and uncertain, open to (and requiring) interpretation. This central epistemology about 
knowledge and learning triggers parallel shifts in the learners’ view about the role of the 
teacher—moving from an Authority as the source of ‘Truth’ to an authority as resource 
with specific expertise to share, as well as the role of the student—moving from a passive 
receptor of facts to an active agent in defining arguments and creating new knowledge” 
(Moore, 2002, p.22). One of cultural dimensions that Hofstede (1991) used to distinguish 
people’s relationship with their authority is power distance.
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Power distance is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally” (p. 28). Power distance is often reflected in the hierarchical organization of 
companies, the respect expected to be shown by the students towards their teacher, the 
political forms of decentralization and centralization, by the belief in society that 
inequalities among people should be minimized, or that they are expected and desired. In 
educational settings, he noted, the larger the power distance, the more students become 
dependent on teachers; the smaller the power distance, the more students become 
independent of teachers. He pointed out that in large power distance situations, there 
exists a teacher-student inequality that “caters to the need for dependence well 
established in the student’s mind” (p.34). In such a situation, the teacher-centered mode 
of teaching becomes the norm of the educational process in which “teachers outline the 
intellectual paths to be followed” and “the quality of one’s learning is virtually 
exclusively dependent on the excellence of one’s teachers” (p.35). Source of knowledge 
is believed to be at or close to the lower end of the continuum (see Table 17), that is, 
knowledge is handed down by teachers, authority or experts and that knowledge is certain 
and permanent. In contrast, in small power distance situations, teachers and students are 
expected to assume an equal position, and “the educational process is student-centered, 
with a premium on student initiative; students are expected to find their own intellectual 
paths” (p.34). Source of knowledge is expected to be at or close to the higher end of the 
continuum where knowledge is acquired through reason and evidence (see Table 17).
Scholars (Scollon & Scollon, 1994) found the following fundamental differences 
in the interpretations of authority by Asians and Westerners, “the Asian focuses on the
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care, nurture and benevolence (or their absence) of the person in authority while the 
Westerner tends to focus on the restriction, limitation and dependence of the person over 
which the authority is exercised” (p.21).
These differences were reflected in educational settings as the teacher-student 
relationship affecting students’ epistemological beliefs. For instance, Szalay et al. (1994) 
found that, Chinese students, rather than the North American students, viewed their 
teacher as mediator or transmitter of knowledge and “an idealized role model, a resource 
for solving all types of human problems, and a model for lifestyle as well” (p.245). The 
teacher was in an idealized role endowed with a great deal of authority, esteem, and 
respect. The students themselves were recipient of knowledge and were described as 
naive and of simple moral character. In such a socio-cultural context, students are 
expected to show respect for, and be obedient to authority figures including their teachers 
and elders, and both students and teachers are expected to live up to the criteria and 
norms of Chinese society.
However, the findings of my study indicated that the situation discussed above is 
changing: Chinese college students tended to believe less than their American 
counterparts that knowledge was certain and handed down from authority. Authority 
figures such as teachers are not considered as a sole source of knowledge. Stigler and 
Stevenson (1991) found in their study that the classrooms in Taiwan, China and Japan are 
becoming more and more student direct, which is contrary to the beliefs that teachers in 
Asia are thought to be authoritarian and what they create is a teacher directed learning 
environment. Chinese students are benefited more from the interaction with their teachers
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who are available after class for students who have questions (Volet & Pears, 1994; Volet 
& Renshaw, 1995; Kelly & Ha, 1998).
With the influence of information technology, the open policy adopted in China, 
and economic reforms at different levels, there have been changes nowadays in Chinese 
classrooms that have been exposed to both Chinese and Western cultures and philosophy. 
Confucianism may be too narrow a focus in understanding Chinese culture (Chan, 2003b). 
Today’s students may not abide to authority figures as much as their elder generation.
The parenting style has gradually changed from authoritative to liberal. Children are not 
forced to follow what their parents say. The educational reforms such as Quality 
Education and Creativity Education in China drive school and university teaching to 
encourage students to do more reflective thinking instead of mere memorization work.
The existing traditional Chinese culture and philosophy and the interaction with 
increasing influence of Western culture and philosophy might be an explanation for the 
relatively lower mean scores in the belief of authority knowledge from the Chinese 
sample.
In probing the relationship between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs, 
a big difference was found in the two groups—American college students and Chinese 
college students. The findings indicating a negative relationship between the acceptance 
of authority and DIT scores in the American sample were consistent with previous 
studies (Bendixen et al., 1998; Curtis et al., 1988; Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Presley, 
1985); the findings were also consistent with those of Walker et al. (1991), who reported 
that the DIT scores increased as epistemological beliefs measured on a unidimensional 
scale became more sophisticated. Likewise, the negative correlation between simple
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knowledge, certain knowledge, and quick learning indicated that scores high on those 
dimensions were correlated negatively with DIT scores, suggesting that higher levels of 
principled moral reasoning were associated with a more sophisticated, and presumably 
less conventional, epistemological belief system.
In the survey administered to the Chinese students, participants had trouble 
determining who the protagonist was, and this confusion may help explain the 
inconspicuous correlation between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs in the 
Chinese group. With many Chinese students, this was the first time that they had been 
exposed to such a survey. Therefore, they were not very certain whether they should 
speak for themselves or for the expectations of the society—their parents and their 
teachers. That confusion might come from the tendency of individuals to overestimate 
moral reasoning for themselves in the Chinese sample. As reported in a large scale 
investigation, Chinese Citizens Humanistic Quality Survey (Yuan & Shen, 2006) 
indicated the existence of individuals’ misperception of level of moral reasoning for 
others—individuals tend to view themselves as possessing higher levels of moral 
reasoning than others in the Chinese society. For example, in the survey there are five 
choices for the questions, “What will you do when you are sitting in the bus and see a 
lady with a baby in her arm standing beside you? What do you think the young man 
sitting next to you will do?” A) offer the seat to her, B) pretend not to see her, C) offer 
her the seat after the busman says so, D) offer the seat after the lady asks, and E) do not 
offer the seat under any circumstances. The results of the survey indicated that 82.3% of 
the respondents chose A (offering the seat) and 2.6% of the respondents chose B 
(pretending not to see) for themselves. While referring to the young man who had a seat
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on the bus, only 31.8% of the respondents thought that he was willing to offer the seat (A) 
and 20.5% of the respondents thought that he would pretend not to see her (B). The 
tendency of people to underestimate the others’ willingness to help, a misperception of 
the others’ level of moral reasoning, might account for the weak and disjointed 
correlation between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs in the Chinese sample.
Another explanation for the weak relationship between moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs might be found in the fact that Chinese moral education is now 
shifting its focus away from ideological education to citizenship education, a shift which 
requires both Chinese educators and students are facing the challenges for moral 
education reform. Traditional Chinese moral education developed from its ideological 
aspects in ancient China, according to Li et al. (2004), with the traditions of first equating 
politics with morality, phrasing them both in the same language, and then o f encouraging 
correct moral and political relations and behaviors through education. This trend dates 
back three thousand years to Zhou Gong and continued through Confucius and his 
followers. From 1949 through the Cultural Revolution and the present transition to a 
market economy, a similarly unified approach to political, ideological and moral 
education has gone into effect through the organizational medium of moral education 
(Sautman, 1991; Li et al., 2004). This reflects important changes in core values to include 
individualism, economic initiative and consumerism, all of which confront Chinese 
society and education with distinct challenges and opportunities and suggest even further 
reform of moral education during the 21st century. Contemporary moral education in 
China as a concept is very comprehensive with its twofold aspects. One is through 
subject-based moral education, while the other is supposed to be by means of all kinds of
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extra-curricular activities (Zhu & Liu, 2004). A great effort has been made by the 
Chinese educational authority to promulgate some moral education guidelines such as 
“Regulation of the Work of Moral Education in Primary and Secondary Schools”,
“Outline for Moral Education in Primary and Secondary Schools” and the “Outline for 
Moral Education in Secondary Schools” to provide the basic foundation for moral 
education in primary and secondary schools, and “Code of Conduct of Primary School 
Pupils”, the “Code of Conduct of Secondary School Students”, the “Norms of Daily 
Behaviors for Primary School Pupils” have been formulated for setting basic 
requirements for the behaviors of primary and secondary school students to be observed 
by all students. In reality, however, moral education through extra-curricular activities is 
much ignored due to examination oriented school curriculum design. Consequently, this 
may account for problems such as the separation of moral education from children’s lives, 
the moralizing and memorization used as the basic methods of teaching and learning, and 
the overlaps between courses on society and ideological moral character (Lu & Gao,
2004). “Virtue lies in practice” and “lifelong moral education” (Wang, 2004) concepts 
through implementation and practice of “quality-oriented education” (Zhan & Ning, 2004) 
are still challenges for Chinese moral educators, particularly in this transitional era when 
Chinese society is transforming itself through widespread modernization efforts in every 
area.
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Limitations of the Study
Difficulty o f Measuring Moral Reasoning and Epistemological Beliefs
The third explanation for the unobtrusive correlation between moral reasoning 
and epistemological beliefs in the Chinese sample is that measuring moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs is difficult. As discussed in the first three chapters, since Perry 
(1970) developed his unidimensional intellectual development model, educationalists and 
psychologists have attempted to implement different models (Hofer, 2004a) to examine 
personal beliefs about the nature of knowledge that may influence comprehension 
(Schommer, 1990), cognitive processing (Kardash & Howell, 2000), and conceptual 
change learning (Qian & Alverman, 2000). Different approaches are used in the 
conceptualization and investigation of personal beliefs, for example, the reflective 
judgment model (King & Kitchener, 1994), the embedded systemic model (Schommer- 
Aikins 2004), the epistemological reflection model (Baxter Magolda, 1992, 2001), the 
epistemic metacognition (Kichener 1983; Kuhn, 1999b), and the “epistemological 
resources” (Hammer & Elby, 2000, 2002). Bendixen and Rule (2004) synthesized 
findings from a variety of studies to propose a more integrated model in an attempt to 
provide a guiding framework for addressing some of the key issues raised by diverse 
models. To confirm and measure their models, different instruments were developed. 
Perry (1970) and his colleagues devised a paper-and-pencil instrument, the Checklist o f  
Educational Views (CLEV) to confirm the model developed from the initial interviews.
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King (1986) developed the Reflective Judgment Interview to measure individuals’ 
level within the seven stages of the Reflective Judgment Model. Boyes and Chandler 
(1992) measure epistemic development by the Epistemic Doubt Interview. Baxter 
Magolda developed the Measure of Epistemological Reflection (MER), a standardized, 
open-ended questionnaire with a standardized rating protocol (Baxter Magolda, 1992; 
Baxter Magolda and Porterfield, 1988). Galotti et al. (1999) developed the Attitudes 
Toward Thinking and Learning Survey (ATTLS). Schommer developed a 63-item 
questionnaire to assess the five beliefs among college students. Similar to Schommer’s 
questionnaire, Jehng et al.’s questionnaire (Jehng et al., 1993) presents statements about 
learning and knowledge. In an effort to improve on Schommer’s questionnaire, Schraw et 
al. (1995) constructed the Epistemic Belief Inventory, which was found to be a better 
instrument to measure individuals’ epistemological beliefs. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three, it is for EBI’s better predictive validity and considerably better test-retest 
reliability that EBI was utilized in this study. However, there exist similar limitations in 
this instrument to those found in the other instruments used for measuring individuals’ 
epistemological beliefs; to be specific, the internal consistency of the epistemological 
belief questionnaire used for this study was found to be low in the Chinese group. The 
limitations as Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001) concluded:
An important issue that may be more obtuse is a potential limitation of all of the 
instruments that presently exist. Although the instruments presented may have 
satisfactorily captured epistemological beliefs within a culture (e.g., among men, 
among women, among U.S. citizens), the approaches may not be open to the
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discovery of new patterns across cultures (e.g., between countries, between ethnic 
groups, between genders). Indeed, it is likely that there are patterns of 
epistemological beliefs not yet fathomed by any of the extant epistemological 
belief researchers (pp. 445-446).
Use o f Convenience Samples
This study utilized available college students from three different universities, one 
from the United States and the other two from China. Of the two Chinese universities, 
Luoyang Normal University is a pre-service teacher training institution and Central 
University for Nationalities is a university mainly for minority students. The students 
from Old Dominion University in the United States are teacher education students from 
various majors. There is an age difference as well as educational level difference between 
the Chinese sample and the American sample. This study’s American sample, including 
both undergraduates and postgraduates, were between the ages of 18 and 51, while the 
Chinese sample clustered between 18 and 24 year olds, mainly sophomores. Although 
both the American sample and the Chinese college students from LNU were teacher 
education students, the Chinese students from CUN were from different majors ranging 
from Journalism to Computer Science. In addition, the course size ranged from 30 to over 
200 students. Although students included in this study maybe fairly representative of 
their respective universities’ typical population, it is possible that systematic differences 
between students enrolled in the various courses existed.
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Use o f the Cross-sectional Data
The findings and the interpretations thereof in this study were based on the cross- 
sectional data from the survey. A richer perspective would be established by using the 
data from a longitudinal investigation, assessing college students’ moral reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs at several points in time, rather than merely comparing two 
groups at one point in time, as was done in the present study. Individuals’ moral 
reasoning and epistemological beliefs do change over time (Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1973, 
1975, 1987; Schommer, 1998, 2002; Narvaez et al., 1999; Bendixen & Rule, 2004), and a 
longitudinal study could better capture such moral and epistemological change. It is 
hoped that this study could be extended as a longitudinal study for further and deeper 
exploration.
Other Possible Factors Affecting the Differences in Epistemological Beliefs Between 
American College Students and Chinese College Students
Educational Level and Age
According to Perry’s study, higher educational level was related to higher stage 
thinking, from freshman to senior year. Baxter Magolda (2002) had similar findings in 
her longitudinal study of college students; for example, transitional knowing, the 
dominant mode of knowing, was used by 32% of first-year students, 53% of sophomores, 
83% of juniors, and 80% of the seniors. In one of the few studies of individuals across a 
larger age span, with 169 participants ranging from teenagers to 60-year olds,
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epistemological level and educational background were positively correlated. Evaluative 
reasoning, the highest level, was exhibited only by those with advanced education (Kuhn, 
1991).
This study’s American sample, including both undergraduates and postgraduates, 
were between the ages of 18 and 51, while the Chinese sample clustered between 18 and 
24 year olds, mainly sophomores. This might explain the findings that American college 
students had lower mean scores in simple knowledge and quick learning than Chinese 
college students.
However, some researchers reported from their studies that certain age groups or 
educational backgrounds did not affect individuals’ epistemological beliefs or moral 
reasoning. For example, Moore’s (1991) Measure of Intellectual Development (MID) 
indicated that there was little change between 18- and 21-year olds. When comparing 
junior college students’ degree of belief in simple knowledge, certain knowledge, innate 
ability, and quick learning to that of university students, Schommer (1993a) found that 
junior college students were more likely to believe in simple, certain knowledge, and 
quick learning. University students were more likely to believe in innate ability. 
Background variables, such as age, gender, and parental education also contributed to 
differences between groups. Bendixen et al. (1998) examined the relationship among age, 
education, gender, syllogistic reasoning skill, epistemological beliefs, and moral 
reasoning in undergraduate students (n — 154). Results of the regression analysis 
indicated that neither the age nor the education variables reached significance once 
gender was entered into the equation.
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Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of moral development proposed that moral reasoning 
ability increases over time, and both theory and research confirm that age is positively 
correlated to increasing moral reasoning scores through adolescence. This study, however, 
concerns college students, adults who are 18 years of age or older. Research involving 
college students has produced contradictory results (Maclean, 2001). There is evidence 
that moral reasoning abilities increase in college and at a rate faster than the general 
population, with older students scoring higher than younger students (Kurtines, 1982; 
Rykiel, 1995). However, in this study, although there were graduate students and elder 
students in the American sample, with their mean age 24.7 ranging from 18 years old to 
51, their DIT mean scores were lower than the Chinese college students who were mostly 
sophomores, with their mean age 20.9 ranging from 18 years old to 24. This is consistent 
with Duckett, Rowan, Ryden, and Krichbaum (1997)’s findings on changes in moral 
reasoning between entry and exit from a baccalaureate nursing program (n = 348). These 
researchers found that age did not contribute significantly to explaining DIT measured 
moral reasoning score variance. Also, in a study of 143 graduate and undergraduate 
students from two universities in Florida, Bateman (1999) found no significant effect of 
age on moral development.
In a dissertation investigating ethical decision making in federal managers, Gentle 
(1997) did not find a significant correlation between either age or education and moral 
reasoning scores. When age and education and their interaction were combined, she 
found that age and education combined are positively related with moral reasoning and 
result in higher P scores from the DIT. These results suggest an age-education interaction
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
effect. Similarly, in Rykiel’s (1995) study, a significant age-work interaction occurred in 
that older students who worked less scored highest in moral reasoning scores.
Additionally, a number of large-scale secondary analyses of several thousand 
subjects each indicate that age-education differences account for about 40% to 50% of 
the variance in moral reasoning scores (Rest, 1986). As previously discussed, years in 
college or professional school are very powerful in promoting development of moral 
reasoning (Rest, 1994).
Academic Major
In a comparative study between technological science majors and social science 
majors on their degree of belief in simple knowledge, certain knowledge, innate ability, 
and quick learning, Schommer (1993a) found that technological science majors were 
more likely to believe in quick learning. Background variables, such as age, gender, and 
parental education, also contributed to differences between groups. But in the two related 
studies of college students (n=95 and 114) who completed an epistemological 
questionnaire with a specific domain in mind (social sciences or mathematics), read a 
passage, answered a passage test, and completed another epistemological questionnaire, 
Schommer and Walker’s report (1995) supported the idea that individuals’ 
epistemological beliefs tended to be domain independent.
Paulsen and Wells (1998) examined the differences in the epistemological beliefs 
of college students across major fields of study. College students (n=290) were assessed 
for their epistemological beliefs in fixed ability, simple knowledge, quick learning, and
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dimensions, a classification of Biglan’s typology of academic fields (Biglan, 1973a, 
1973b). Their results indicated that students majoring in pure fields were less likely than 
those in applied fields to hold naive beliefs in simple knowledge, quick learning, and 
certain knowledge, and students majoring in soft or pure fields were less likely than 
others to hold naive beliefs in certain knowledge. The results of this study suggest that 
students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and learning are related to the 
disciplinary contexts in which students select and experience their specialized 
coursework in college. Gender, age, and GPA also were found related to students’ beliefs.
In exploring the domain specificity of students’ beliefs about academic 
knowledge in three related studies, Buehl et al. (2002) found that students possess certain 
domain-specific beliefs about knowledge in mathematics and history. Further, a 
significant moderate relationship between the DSBQ and Schommer’s questionnaire 
provided some evidence of domain-generality in undergraduates’ epistemological beliefs. 
In Study I, these items were administered to 182 undergraduates, and the psychometric 
properties and underlying factor structure were examined via exploratory factor analysis. 
In Study II, the modified instrument, the Domain-Specific Beliefs Questionnaire (DSBQ), 
was administered to 633 students, and a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. A 
subsample of participants’ responses on the DSBQ also was compared to responses on 
Schommer’s epistemological questionnaire. Study III involved a second confirmatory 
factor analysis using data from a new sample (n = 523). Those data were examined for 
potential gender differences.
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The DIT has been used to measure differences in the moral reasoning of college 
students across academic disciplines (Zeidler & Schafer, 1984; St. Pierre, Nelson, & 
Gabbin, 1990; Icerman, Karcher, & Kennelley, 1991; Paradice & Dejoie, 1991; Jeffrey, 
1993; Ponemon & Gabhart, 1994; Snodgrass & Behling, 1996; Cummings et al., 2001; 
King & Mayhew, 2002). Variability of moral reasoning scores within certain disciplines 
has also been observed (Icerman et al., 1991; Paradice & Dejoie, 1991; Jeffrey, 1993).
Several other studies also have attempted to measure differences in moral 
reasoning between academic disciplines (St. Pierre et al., 1990; McNeel, 1994; Snodgrass 
& Behling, 1996), yielding inconclusive results. McNeel’s research (1994) indicated very 
strong college effects on moral reasoning. This impact is particularly strong in liberal arts 
colleges and in disciplines that explore people and values. Students in more vocationally 
oriented disciplines such as business and education have shown considerably lower DIT 
score growth over their college experience. St. Pierre et al. (1990) found that accounting 
majors and students majoring in other business disciplines (i.e., finance, information 
systems, hotel/restaurant management, management, marketing and international 
business) showed lower levels of postconventional moral reasoning than did students in 
psychology, math and social work. Snodgrass and Behling (1996), by contrast, found no 
significant differences in the moral reasoning levels between business and non-business 
majors (i.e., arts and humanities, social sciences, natural sciences and undeclared).
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Religious Beliefs
Another factor contributing to the differences in epistemological beliefs between 
American and Chinese college students might be individuals’ religious beliefs. As 
discussed in the first chapter, the United States is considered as a multiracial country built 
on Judeo-Christian principles while China has been influenced traditionally by 
Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Although not taught in school in either country, 
religion is undoubtedly an integrated part of people’s lives that might affect individuals’ 
epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning. In a study exploring the relationship 
between psycho-epistemological styles and three religious dimensions, Desimpelaere et 
al. (1999) used Wilkinson and Migotsky (1994)’s three factors (naive realism, logical 
inquiry and skeptical subjectivism) and Perry (1970)’s dualism, relativism and 
commitment as psycho-epistemological items. The religious dimensions were orthodoxy, 
historical relativism and external criticism (Hutsebaut, 1996; 1997). Results show that 
dualism relates to both orthodoxy and external criticism, and that relativism and 
commitment relate to historical relativism.
In another study investigating the relationship between the religiosity dimensions 
and both moral attitudes and moral competence, Duriez and Soenens (2006) used the 
Post-Critical Belief Scale (Duriez, Fontaine, & Hutseabut, 2000) as a measure of Wulff 
(1991)’s religiosity dimensions (Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal 
versus Symbolic), and the Moral Judgment Test (Lind, 1998) as a measure of both moral
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attitudes and moral competence. Results from a middle adolescent sample (N = 338), a 
university sample (N = 336) and an adult sample (N = 336) suggested, that whereas the 
Literal versus Symbolic dimension shows substantial relations with moral attitudes and 
moral competence, the Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence dimension is related 
to neither of them. The findings indicated that, although there was no intrinsic 
relationship between religiosity and morality, the way people process religious content 
was predictive o f the way they deal with moral issues.
Because of the difficulties inherent to classification of religions, this study did not 
examine religious background as a factor to affect individuals’ epistemological beliefs 
and moral reasoning. Very little research was found in this area, and the validation of 
Hutsebaut’s religious dimensions needs support from more research, especially the 
research to investigate religious background or beliefs as a factor affecting individuals’ 
epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning in different cultures. Complexity of religious 
beliefs and their influence as a factor to affect individuals’ epistemological beliefs and 
moral reasoning are worth a new line of research (Berger, 1997), as are the economic 
system and political system in which an individual is living.
In summary, the results of the present investigation indicate that cross-cultural 
similarities and differences in epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning exist between 
American and Chinese college students. Because this study determined no interaction 
between either gender or ethnicity and moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs, and, 
likewise, no difference in epistemological belief in innate ability between the two groups, 
this study may provide evidence that seems to support the similarities and universal 
aspects of psychological development. The significant differences in epistemological
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beliefs in simple knowledge, certain knowledge, omniscient authority and quick learning, 
and in the relationships between moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs in the 
American and Chinese sample can be accounted for by differences in cultural context.
Conclusion, Suggestions and Implications
The results of the current investigations lend some support to the validity and 
universality of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development and previous studies on cultural 
differences of college students’ epistemological beliefs. That is, differences in gender and 
ethnicity are not dependable predictions of differences in epistemological beliefs and 
moral reasoning in either American or Chinese college students. Different from the 
previous studies (Belensky et al. 1986; Baxter Magolda, 1990; Schommer & Dunenll, 
1994; Knight, Elfenbein, & Martin, 1997; Galotti et al., 1999; Knight et al., 2000; Galotti 
et al., 1999; Marrs, 2005), the findings of the present study are consistent with other 
research in which there were no significant differences found between male and female 
participants in moral reasoning (Gibbs, Arnold, & Burkhardt, 1984; Walker, 1984; Jaffee 
& Hyde, 2000) and epistemological beliefs (Unger, Draper, & Pendergrass, 1986; Martin, 
et al. 1994). Gilligan’s (1982) charges of Kohlberg’gender-bias in Kohlberg’s model 
were not substantiated by the present study.
The findings of the present investigation found no effect of ethnicity in college 
students’ moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs, inconsistent with those previous 
studies (Pai, 1990; Schommer, 1993a). The differences in epistemological beliefs 
between American and Chinese college students were cross-cultural, or rather, cross­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
national. This cultural comparison of moral reasoning and epistemological beliefs 
between American and Chinese college students provided findings in an area that has not 
been addressed in any previous investigation.
However, caution must be used to ensure that the results and conclusions of this 
study are not generalized to elementary or secondary school level in that the samples used 
in this study were drawn from American and Chinese college students. Future research is 
needed to further examine the meaning of these findings and to add to our knowledge 
base regarding epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning.
The epistemological belief research on psychological basis has been undertaken 
mostly in North America and the instruments used for measuring epistemological beliefs 
were developed originally for white middle-class adults (Schommer, 1998), and clearly 
grounded in the culture of Western higher education. There is a need for future research 
to adapt or develop some instruments by taking into account the subjects’ cultural, 
educational, and social background. With similar problems to those found by Jeong 
(2003), the internal consistency of the epistemological belief questionnaire used for this 
study was found low in the Chinese group of a = .42 for Simply Knowledge, a  = .66 for 
Certain Knowledge, a  = .42 for Quick Learning, a  = .45 for Omniscient Authority, and a  
= .52 for Innate Ability, although the results were found higher with the American group, 
with a = .49 for Simply Knowledge, a = .63 for Certain Knowledge, a  = .52 for Quick 
Learning, a  = .54 for Omniscient Authority, and a = .65 for Innate Ability.
From a methodological perspective, this study used samples available to the 
researcher, and the sampling data was cross-sectional in nature, it is suggested that more 
longitudinal and multidimensional studies are needed to track students’ epistemological
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and moral development. Because random sampling was not possible in the present study, 
a large random sample chosen from different colleges and universities (public and 
private) would provide more information about the actual moral development of 
university students and the influence of more social and personal factors. In addition, if 
combined with in-depth interviews (Brownlee, 2002) to complement quantitative data, a 
qualitative investigation may provide a more trustworthy study for epistemological 
beliefs and moral reasoning.
Of the three universities sampled for this study, the two groups of the sample 
students were education majors, and these students are likely to become teachers after 
their graduation. Previous studies indicated that moral reasoning ability could improve at 
the collegiate level (Burwell, 1997; McNeel, 1992; King & Matthew, 2002). Such 
collegiate effect was reflected in epistemological beliefs as well (Perry, 1970; Baxter 
Magolda, 1993). It will be of interest to conduct a longitudinal study to follow up these 
students’ epistemological and moral development after they change their role from 
college students to teachers. Different from their roles as students, as teachers they will 
need increasingly to work with diverse students in their teaching career. “They need to 
manage and interact with a broad range of students, parents, colleagues and 
administrative personnel, often in order to address a range of ill-defined problems” 
(Brownlee, 2002). Therefore, “the way teachers perceive their practice recasts their 
knowing from formal reasoning and reflection upon action to a complex set of ways of 
thinking about what it means to a teacher” (Terri et al., 1999). In return, such a 
longitudinal study will provide for information for teacher education courses to address 
epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning to prepare perspective teachers for complex,
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demanding teaching roles, more able to deal with ill-defined problems and, likewise, 
more able to recognize the importance of sophisticated beliefs and higher levels of 
reasoning for themselves as learners and for the students they teach.
Despite the limitations, the present study identified cultural differences 
significantly related to students’ use of higher-stage moral reasoning and “sophisticated” 
views of knowledge. The study of American and Chinese students’ epistemological 
beliefs and moral reasoning will open a new avenue allowing for examination of the 
relations among their unique cultural, educational, and social backgrounds, their 
development of beliefs about knowledge and knowing, and moral judgment development. 
The findings of this research may have some educational implications.
First, through uncovering the epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning held by 
the college students from different cultures, the findings of this study may enable 
educational policy makers, curriculum developers, teachers and students to understand 
college students’ epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning so that appropriate 
curriculum, teaching pedagogies and learning approaches may be developed. This new 
curriculum will promote students’ more sophisticated epistemological beliefs and higher 
stages of moral reasoning. The findings also will be conducive to the developers of 
cultural exchange programs with the awareness of cultural differences when developing 
such programs, particularly between the United States and China.
Second, the results of the present study have implications for the development of 
a comprehensive program of character education in public schools that would strengthen 
students’ moral and intellectual development, balancing developmental psychology and 
cultural differences that exist among nations. Successful character education programs
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designed for students to be “good and smart” (Allen & Cosby, 2000) may be shared and 
disseminated among different nations with a full awareness of both universal and 
particular aspects of epistemological and moral development across cultures.
Third, the results of this study should invoke more discussion addressing the 
erroneous beliefs and conceptions of Western scholars that Asian students hold their 
beliefs on simple knowledge and quick learning and rely on rote learning and surface 
study approach, which was referred to as “the paradox of the Chinese learner” (Marton et 
al. 1993, pp.15-16; Watkins & Biggs, 1996). Biggs’ argument was introduced in this 
study for the explanation of the misperception of Western scholars on the study approach 
of Chinese students (Watkins & Biggs, 1996).
Fourth, knowledge learning and moral education are the two pillars for character 
education that enable students to develop both intellectually and morally. In moral 
education, a fundamental principle has been “knowledge and action going hand in hand” 
and the integration of learning and doing (Zhou, 2006, pp. 163-167). By understanding 
students’ beliefs and reasoning, a new curriculum focusing on academic and moral 
education can be integrated in college classes. This new curriculum will enhance 
students’ learning through active involvement in school and community projects. To 
educating people to be good and smart is a life-long process and to promote it in a 
sustainable way warrants additional research. Conducting and incorporating such 
research through the lens of epistemological and moral development provides a means to 
promote high quality education for individuals throughout the world.
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APPENDIX A. DIT-2 Instructions
This questionnaire is concerned with how you define the issues in a social problem. Several stories about social 
problems will be described. After each story, there will be a list o f questions. The questions that follow each story 
represent different issues that might be raised by the problem. In other words, the questionnaire/issues raise different 
ways o f judging what is important in making a decision about the social problem. You will be asked to rate and rank 
the questions in terms o f how important each one seems to you.
This questionnaire is in two parts; one part contains the INSTRUCTIONS (this part) and the stories presenting the 
social problems; the other part contains the questions (issues) and the ANSWER SHEET on which to write your 
responses.
Here is an illustration case and sample questionnaire.
Presidential Election
Imagine that you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency o f the United States. Imagine that before you vote, 
you are given several questions, and asked which issue is the most important to you in making up your mind about 
which candidate to vote for. In this example, 5 items are given. On a rating scale o f 1 to 5 (l=Great, 2=Much, 3=Some, 
4=Little, 5=No) please rate the importance o f the item (issue) by filling in with a pencil one o f  the bubbles on the 
answer sheet by each item.
Assume that you thought that item #1 (below) was o f great importance, item #2 had some importance, item #3 had no 
importance, item #4 had much importance, and item #5 had much importance. Then you would fill in the bubbles on 
the answer sheet as shown below.
IMPORTANCE: Great DMuch DSome I ILittle No
•  □ □ □ □ 1. Financially are you personally better o ff now than you were four years ago?
□ □ •  □ □ 2. Does one candidate have a superior personal moral character?
□ □ □ •  □ 3. Which candidate stands the tallest?
□ •  □ □ □ 4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
□ •  □ □ □ 5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country’s internal problems, like crime and health care?
Further, the questionnaire will ask you to rank the question in terms o f importance. In the space below, the numbers at 
the top, 1 through 12, represent the item number. From top to bottom, you are asked to fill in the bubble that represents 
the item in first importance (o f those given to you to choose from), then second most important, third most important, 
and fourth most important. Please indicate your top four choices. You might fill out this part, as follows:
1 Most Important 4__ Second Most Important 5 Third Most Important 3 Fourth Most Important
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Note that some o f the items may seem irrelevant to you (as in item #3) or not make sense to you— in that case, rate the 
item as “no” importance and do not rank the item. Note that in the stories that follow, there will be 12 items for each 
story, not five. Please make sure to consider all 12 items (questions) that are printed after each story.
In addition you will be asked to state your preference for what action to take in the story. After the story, you will be 
asked to indicate the action you favor on a seven-point scale (1= strongly favor some action, 7=strongly oppose the 
action).
In short, read the story from this booklet, then fill out your answers on the answer sheet. Please use a #2 pencil. If you 
change your mind about a response, erase the pencil mark cleanly and enter your new response.
/Notice the second part o f this questionnaire, the Answer Sheet. The Identification Number at the top o f the answer 
sheet may already be filled in when you receive your materials. I f  not, you will receive instructions about how to fill in 
the number. I f  you have questions about the procedure, please ask now. Please turn now to the Answer Sheet]
Famine (Story 1)
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages o f food before, but this year’s famine is worse than ever. 
Some families are even trying to feed themselves by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near 
starvation. He has heard that a rich man in his village has supplies o f food stored away and is hoarding food while its 
price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate and thinks about stealing some 
food from the rich man’s warehouse. The small amount o f food that he needs for his family probably wouldn’t even be 
missed.
What should Mustaq Singh do? Do you favor the action of taking the food (Mark one)
 Should take the food  Can’t decide Should not take the food
Rate the following 12 issues in terms o f importance (1-5)
IMPORTANCE: □ Great JMuch C Some □ Little No
□ □ □ □ □ 1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for stealing?
□ □ □ □ □ 2. Isn’t it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal?
□ □ □ □ □ 3. Shouldn’t the community’s laws be upheld?
□ □ □ □ □ 4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?
0  □ □ □ □ 5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are starving?
□ □ □ □ □ 6 . Is the motive o f Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?
□ □ □ □ □ 7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?
□ □ □ □ □ 8. Is the epitome o f eating reconcilable with t he culpability o f  stealing?
□ □ □ □ □ 9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?
□ □ □ □ □ 10. Isn’t private property an institution to enable the rich to exploit the poor?
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□ □ □ □ □ 11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or wouldn’t it?
□ □ □ □ □ 12. Are laws getting in the way o f the most basic claim o f any member o f a society?
From the list above, select the four most important:
 Most Important Second Most Important Third Most Important Fourth Most Important
Reporter (Story 2)
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a decade. Almost by accident, she learned 
that one o f the candidates for Lieutenant Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting 
20 years earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had undergone a confused 
period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be very out-of-character now. His shop-lifting had been 
a minor offense and charges had been dropped by the department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself 
out since then, but built a distinguished record in helping many people and in leading constructive community projects. 
Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and likely to go on to important leadership 
positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders whether or not she should write the story about Thompson’s earlier 
troubles because in the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story could wreck Thompson’s 
chance to win.
Do you favor the action o f reporting the story? (Mark one.)
 □ Should report the story DCan’tdecid e □ Should not report the story
IMPORTANCE: □ Great DMuch iSome iLittle No
□ □ □ □ □ 1. Doesn’t the public have a right to know all the facts about all candidates for office?
□ □ □ □ □ 2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton’s reputation for investigative reporting?
□ □ □ □ □ 3. If Dayton doesn’t publish the story wouldn’t another reporter get the story anyway and get the credit for 
investigative reporting?
□ □ □ □ □ 4. Since the voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton does?
□ □ □ □ □ 5. Hasn’t Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than in his earlier days as a shop­
lifter?
□ □ □ □ □ 6 . What would best serve society?
□ □ □ □ □ 7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
□ □ □ □ □ 8 . How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story about candidate 
Thompson?
□ □ □ □ □ 9. Does the right o f “habeas corpus” apply in this case?
□ □ □ □ □ 10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?
□ □ □ □ □ 11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting everything she learns 
about them, good and bad?
□ □ □ □ □ 12. Isn’t it a reporter’s duty to report all the news regardless o f  the circumstances?
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From the list above, select the four most important:
 Most Important Second Most Important Third Most Important Fourth Most Important
School Board (Story 3)
Mr. Grant has been elected to School Board District 190 and was chosen to be Chairman. The district is bitterly divided 
over the closing o f  one o f the high schools. One o f the high schools has to be closed for financial reasons, but there is 
no agreement over which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a series o f  
“Open Meetings” in which members o f  the community could voice their opinions. He hoped that the dialogue would 
make the community realize the necessity o f  closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussions, the 
difficulty o f the decision would be appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the school board 
decision. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate speeches dominated the microphones and threatened 
violence. The meeting barely closed without fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening 
phone calls. Mr. Grant wonders if  he ought to call off the next Open Meeting.
Do you favor calling o ff the next Open Meeting? (Mark one.)
 Should call o f  the next open meeting Can’t decide Should have the next open meeting
IMPORTANCE: □ Great Much Some □ Little DNo
□ □ □ □ □ 1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have Open Meetings on major school board decisions?
□ □ □ □ □ 2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by discounting the Open 
Meetings?
□ □ □ □ □ 3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grant if  he stopped the Open Meetings?
□ □ □ □ □ 4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?
□ □ □ □ □ 5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legai authority to protect the Board by 
making decisions in closed meetings?
□ □ □ □ □ 6 . Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if  he stopped the open meetings?
□ □ □ □ □ 7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard?
□ □ □ □ □ 8 . Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or prevent them from making 
long speeches?
□ □ □ □ □ 9. Are some people deliberately undermining the school board process by playing some sort o f power game?
□ □ □ □ □ 10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community’s ability to handle controversial issues 
in the future?
□ □ □ □ □ 11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads, and is the community in general really fair-minded and 
democratic?
□ □ □ □ □ 12. What is the likelihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion from the community? 
From the list above, select the four most important:
 Most Important Second Most Important Third Most Important Fourth Most Important
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Cancer (Story 4)
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases o f colon cancer. She is in terrible pain and asks the doctor to give 
her more pain -killer medicine. The doctor has given her the maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the 
dosage because it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says that she 
realizes this, but wants to end her suffering even if  it means ending her life. Should the doctor give her an increased 
dosage?
Do you favor the action o f giving more medicine? (Mark one.)
 Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her d ie  Can’t decide Should not give her an
increased dosage
IMPORTANCE: Great DMuch DSome : Little I !No
□ □ □ □ □ 1. Isn’t the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else i f  giving an overdose would be the same as 
killing her?
□ □ □ □ □ 2. Wouldn’t society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?
□ □ □ □ □ 3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?
□ □ □ □ □ 4. Does the family o f  Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller medicine?
□ □ □ □ □ 5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
□ □ □ □ □ 6 . Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don’t want to live?
□ □ □ □ □ 7. Is helping to end another’s life ever a responsible act o f cooperation?
□ □ □ □ □ 8 . Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?
□ □ □ □ □ 9. Wouldn’t the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?
□ □ □ □ □ 10. Should only God decide when a person’s life should end?
□ □ □ □ □ 11. Shouldn’t society protect everyone against being killed?
□ □ □ □ □ 12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to die i f  the person 
wants to?
From the list above, select the four most important:
 Most Important Second Most Important Third Most Important Fourth Most Important
Demonstration (Story 5)
Political and economic instability in a South America country prompted the President o f the United States to send 
troops to “police” the area. Students at many campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United States is using its 
military might for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational companies are 
pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if  it means loss o f life. Students at one campus took to the 
streets in demonstration, tying up traffic and stopping regular business in the town. The president o f  the university 
demanded that the students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college’s administration 
building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to demonstrate in these ways?
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Do you favor the action o f demonstrating in this way?
 Should continue demonstrating in these w ays Can’t decide Should not continue demonstrating in
these ways
IMPORTANCE: DGreat DMuch DSome DLittle QNo
□ □ □ □ □ 1. Do the students have the right to take over property that doesn’t belong to them?
□ □ □ □ □ 2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
□ □ □ □ □ 3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they doing it just for fun?
□ □ □ □ □ 4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?
□ □ □ □ □ 5. Will the public blame all students for the actions o f a few student demonstrators?
□ □ □ □ □ 6 . Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed o f the multinational oil companies?
□ □ □ □ □ 7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary people?
□ 0  □ □ □ 8 . Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all people?
□ □ □ □ □ 9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?
□ □ □ □ □ 10. Shouldn’t the authorities be respected by students?
□ □ □ □ □ 11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles o f justice?
□ □ □ □ □ 12. Isn’t it everyone’s duty to obey the law, whether one likes it or not?
From the list above, select the four most important:
 Most Important Second Most Important Third Most Important Fourth Most Important
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APPENDIX B. Epistemic Beliefs Inventory
Instructions: Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each o f the statements listed 
below. Please circle the number that best corresponds to the strength o f your belief.
Strongly Disagree ®<- ®*~ © ^  ©-* © Strongly Agree
□ □ □ □ □ 1. It bothers me when instructors don’t tell students the answers to complicated problems.
□ □ □ □ □ 2. Truth means different things to different people.
□ □ □ □ □ 3. Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.
□ □ □ □ □ 4. People should always obey the law.
□ □ □ □ □ 5. Some people will never be smart no matter how hard they work.
□ □ □ □ □ 6. Absolute moral truth does not exist.
□ □ □ □ □ 7. Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life.
□ □ □ □ □ 8. Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in school.
□ □ □ □ □ 9.1f a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely end up being 
confused.
□ □ □ □ □ 10. Too many theories just complicate things.
□ □ □ □ □ 11. The best ideas are often the most simple.
□ □ □ □ □ 12. People can’t do too much about how smart they are.
□ □ □ □ □ 13. Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories
□ □□□□ 14.1 like teachers who present several competing theories and let their students decide 
which is best.
□ □ □ □ □ 15. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.
□ □ □ □ □ 16. If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever learn it.
□ □ □ □ □ 17. Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t.
□ n □ □ □ 18. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe.
□ □ □ □ □ 19. If two people are arguing about something, at least one o f them must be wrong.
□ □ □ □ □ 20. Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority.
□ □□□□21. If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back over it won’t 
help.
□ □ □ □ □ 22. Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts.
□ □ □ □ □ 23. The moral rules I live by apply to everyone.
□ □ □ □ □ 24. The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know.
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□ □ □ □ □ 25. What is true today will be true tomorrow.
□ □ □ □ □ 26. Smart people are bom that way.
□ □ □ □ □ 27. When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.
□ □ □ □ □ 28. People who question authority are troublemakers.
□ □ □ □ □ 29. Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste o f time.
□ □□□□ 30. You can study something for years and still not really understand it.
□ □ □ □ □ 31. Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s big problems.
□ □ □ □ □ 32. Some people are bom with special gifts and talents.
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APPENDIX C. Demographic Questionnaire
Please answer each of the following questions.
1. Gender_______ Female________ Male
2. Age_______
3. Class Status
_______Freshman_______ Sophomore  Junior_______ Senior Graduate
4. Your Current M ajor________________________________
5. Current GPA at the University____________
6. Ethnic Background
Note: The definitions and explanations of ethic origin are based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) by 
the Census Bureau.
 White
 Black or African American
 American Indian and Alaska Native
 Asian/Pacific Islander
 Hispanic or Latino
Others
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APPENDIX D. Approval Letter from Human Subjects Committee of College of 
Education at ODU
From: Alice Wakefield/ESSE/EDUC/ODU 





The Human Subject Review Committee for the College of Education has reviewed your 
study and found it to be exempt under 6.3. Exempt studies are not required to obtain 
informed consent letters. You may proceed with your investigation. Thank you for your 
submission and good luck with your research.
All the best,
Alice Wakefield, HSR Chair
Alice P. Wakefield 
www. odu. edu/ awakefie
Early Childhood Teacher Educator 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529
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APPENDIX E. Informed Consent
Dear Participant,
The following survey is part of a research project undertaken to fulfill the doctoral 
requirements at Old Dominion University in Virginia, USA. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate the relationships among epistemological beliefs and moral reasoning 
between Chinese and U.S. college students. While there are no direct benefits to you 
from participating in this survey, the results will be useful in future research in human 
behavior. It is expected that completing the questionnaires will take less than 45 minutes. 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and very much appreciated and you can withdraw 
at any time without retribution. There will not be a penalty or any negative effect on your 
grade if you choose not to participate. Your personal information will not appear in the 
data analysis or in any papers to be published. We will only use completed questionnaires. 
Questions regarding the study may be addressed to Zhongtang Ren at (757) 839-0927 or 
at zren@odu.edu. Your signature indicates your willingness to participate in the study. 
Please read the statement of this survey, preview the survey and then sign your name 
below.
Thank you very much for your participation.
Sincerely 
Zhongtang Ren
Print Your First Name____________________ Last Name__________________________
I am willing to complete Zhongtang Ren’s research questionnaires.
Your Signature______________________________________ Date__________________
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
APPENDIX F. Approval Letter by Luoyang Normal University for the Survey
Letter of Authorization 
December 12, 2005
Dear Mr. Ren,
You are granted the permission to collect data necessary for conducting a study on “A 
Cross-cultural study of Epistemological Beliefs and Moral Reasoning between American 




Education Research Center 
Luoyang Normal University 
71 Luolong Road, Anle 
Luoyang, Henan 471022 
China
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APPENDIX G. Approval Letter by Central University for Nationalities for the 
Survey
Letter of Authorization 
January 12, 2006
Dear Mr. Ren,
Please accept this letter as the permission for you to collect data necessary for conducting 
a study on “A Cross-cultural study of Epistemological Beliefs and Moral Reasoning 





School of Foreign Studies
Central University for Nationalities
27 South Street, Zhongguan Cun, Haidian District
Beijing, 100081
China





Ph. D. Urban Studies in Education. 2006, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA  
M. S. Secondary Education. 2001, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA








Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA
Teaching Assistant for Social and Cultural Foundation o f Education
Project Evaluator of ACCT o f PT3 sponsored by US Department o f Education
Selected Member o f ODU Responsible Conduct o f  Research Task Force
Luoyang Normal University, Henan, China
Assistant Professor, teaching Social Studies, English Grammar and Literature 
Deputy Chief o f Education Research Center 
Director o f Academic Affair Office
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA  
Visiting Scholar, doing research for American education
Foreign Investment and Loan Office, Ministry o f Education, Beijing, China 
Project Officer and Translator, working with the United Nations Development 
and Planning (UNDP), the World Bank and other international agencies for 
educational projects in China
Luoyang Normal University, Henan, China
Lecturer &Assistant Professor, teaching English, Literature and Cultural Studies
Allen, D. & Z. Ren. (2005). Values and ethics in higher education. Paper presented at National Academy of 
Educational Administration (NARA). Beijing, China, September 2005.
Ren, Z. et al (2005). How moral sense in different cultures might influence the education system. Full paper 
presented in the Third Global Ethical Symposium & Youth Summit, co-sponsored by the PRIDE, a NGO in 
ECOSOC of the United Nations and the Chinese Academy o f Social Sciences (CASS). Beijing, China, July 
7-11,2005.
Ren, Z. et al. (2004). Moral sense and culture: a conceptual inquiry and preliminary study. Full paper presented at 
International Forum on Integrated Education and Educational Reform, Santa Cruz, CA, October 28-31,2004.
Ren, Z & Wang, J. (2001). Saving faith  (Translation o f David Baldacci’s novel). Nanjing: Yilin Press.
Ren, Z. (2000). A new approach for studying English grammar. Journal o f  Luoyang Normal University, 4, 
129-130.
Ren, Z. (1999). 2+2 teacher’s performance appraisal. Journal o f  Luoyang Normal University, 1, 102-114. 
Ren, Z. et al. (1994). A New Practical English Grammar. Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
